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ABSTRACT
The climate policy debate underwent a profound shift between 2009­
2016. Prior to that point, efforts at the domestic and international levels 
focused on broad, top-down strategies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, with market-based mechanisms expected to play a key role. 
The simultaneous breakdown of the congressional climate policy debate
and the failure of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to produce a new international agreement at the
meeting in Copenhagen raised serious questions about the political viability
of carbon markets, as well as the prospects for implementing meaningful 
near-term emission abatement strategies.
A number of bottom-up strategies have since emerged, including subnational
experimentation with carbon market design, emissions trading options 
under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, and
the UNFCCC’s focus on individual emission reduction commitments by
member nations. These incremental steps represent important progress,
but are incapable of stabilizing or reducing atmospheric GHG concentrations
on their own. The ultimate success of the decentralized mitigation approaches 
currently underway, therefore, depends upon their ability to foster broader 
action. 
This Article explores the shift from top-down to bottom-up approaches 
to carbon market design, focusing on three strategies that have emerged 
since 2009: the California Cap-and-Trade Program, the Clean Power Plan, 
and the UNFCCC process. The Article then examines the prospects for 
broad multilateral markets to emerge under a bottom-up approach and identifies 
three pathways to streamline market design choices: a coordinated approach; 
a dominant actor approach; and a common elements approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION
The climate policy debate underwent a profound shift between 2009­
2016. Prior to that point, efforts at the domestic and international levels 
focused on broad, top-down strategies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, with market-based mechanisms expected to play a key role. 
The U.S. House of Representatives adopted a bill establishing an economy-
wide cap-and-trade program and negotiations through the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process were 
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building toward a new international agreement to limit global emissions. 
The simultaneous breakdown of the congressional climate policy debate
and the failure of the UNFCCC negotiations to produce a new international 
agreement at the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen raised
serious questions about the political viability of carbon markets, as well 
as the prospects for implementing meaningful near-term emission abatement
strategies.
Despite the environmental, economic, and political successes of emissions 
trading in other contexts, these challenges proved insurmountable for U.S.
lawmakers and UNFCCC negotiators in 2009-2010. Efforts to develop
centralized policy platforms to foster the development of these market
approaches stalled at both the national and international levels around roughly
the same time due to the overarching political economy question of who 
bears the costs and who reaps the benefits of a legally-binding emission
reduction requirement.1 Progress was also stifled by disagreement over 
emissions targets, concerns about competitiveness impacts for certain nations, 
states, and industrial sectors, and the sheer size and complexity of programs.2 
The fate of market-based policies has waxed and waned since that time.
While U.S. policymakers have shied away from broad federal legislation 
and international negotiators have shifted away from a uniform, legally-
binding international agreement to tackle climate change, several new
approaches have since emerged. Some subnational governments are unilaterally
implementing market-based climate policies and experimenting with market- 
linkage. In the U.S., the promulgation of the Clean Power Plan—a rule
issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act that establishes state-by-state carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emission limits for the nation’s fleet of existing fossil fuel-
fired power plants—spurred renewed attention on market-based emission
reduction strategies.3 This regulatory approach shifted the domestic climate 
policy debate from whether to regulate electric power sector emissions to
 1. Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate 
Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2009). 
2. This Article does not go into a full post-mortem analysis of the domestic and
UNFCCC climate policy negotiations. For information about the domestic climate policy
debate, see ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR: TRUE BELIEVERS, POWER BROKERS, AND THE
FIGHT TO SAVE THE EARTH (2010).
3. The fate of the Clean Power Plan is uncertain as this article goes to publication. 
President Trump signed an executive order on March 28, 2017 instructing the EPA to
repeal the rule. Executive Order: Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,
Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/presidential­
executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1.
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how to regulate. International efforts to mitigate climate change have
similarly shifted to a bottom-up approach. The UNFCCC process is now 
focused on individual emission reduction pledges by member nations,
with the prospect of linked markets emerging as nations seek options to 
meet their commitments.
The movement away from centralized, comprehensive emission abatement 
strategies to bottom-up approaches has important implications for climate 
policy. Incremental steps by national and subnational actors are incapable
of stabilizing or reducing atmospheric GHG concentrations on their own.
Thus, the success of the decentralized mitigation approaches currently 
underway will turn on whether they foster broader action.
The Article uses the term “top-down” to describe a uniform set of legally 
enforceable rules governing GHG reductions in multiple national or
subnational jurisdictions. The top-down approach may occur via national
rules governing emission reductions across the country or an international 
framework governing emission reductions by nations subject to the
agreement. The federal Waxman-Markey climate bill is an example of a 
pure top-down market approach, as it aimed to establish an emissions cap
for the nation’s electric power national emission limitation, created a 
compliance-based emissions market, and specified the rules governing the 
market. This Article employs the term “bottom-up” to refer to decisions 
made by individual jurisdictions leading to a multilateral approach involving
numerous nations or subnational jurisdictions, such as the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a multistate carbon market operating in the
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic U.S., and the linked carbon market between 
California and Quebec. 
These descriptors are not absolute, as a top-down approach may still 
depend on decisions by individual actors regarding how to meet their
obligations. For example, although the Kyoto Protocol is generally referred
to as a top-down strategy, and meets the definition offered here, in practice 
it is a combination of top-down and bottom-up decision making. The 
agreement included emission reduction commitments by developed countries
that were parties to the agreement and established market mechanisms that 
could contribute to meeting those obligations.4 It was up to the Annex I
countries to determine whether and how to utilize these mechanisms, such 
as the EU decision to allow Kyoto Protocol-based emission reduction 
credits to qualify as compliance instruments within the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS).5 Similarly, the California Cap-and-Trade Program 
is the result of a deliberate set of policy choices on the part of the state’s
4. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 (Mar. 25, 1997). 
5.  Council Directive 2003/87/EC, preamble, para. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC). 
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government officials, but is treated as an example of a “bottom-up” climate
policy in this article due to California’s efforts to broaden the market to 
include additional jurisdictions. 
Carbon markets and the prospect of market linkage offer the potential 
to build upon diffuse decision making by individual national and subnational 
actors. Linking is not an automatic option, however. Political compromises
and financial investments based on initial market design choices shift the 
political economy considerations. The viability of bottom-up market linkage 
may depend on deliberate steps during the policy design process to facilitate
market linkage in the future. 
This Article begins by describing recent top-down approaches to climate
policy and carbon market design included in the Waxman-Markey bill in
the U.S. House of Representatives and the efforts to achieve a unified,
legally-binding agreement through the UNFCCC process. It then discusses 
the breakdown of policy debates at both levels and the renewed prospects 
for carbon market implementation through three strategies that have emerged
since 2009: the California Cap-and-Trade Program, the Clean Power Plan, 
and the UNFCCC process. The Article concludes by examining the prospects 
for broad multilateral markets to emerge under a bottom-up approach and
identifying three pathways to streamline market design choices: a coordinated 
approach, a dominant actor approach, and a common elements approach. 
II. TOP-DOWN CARBON MARKET STRATEGIES
Climate change presents perhaps the most vexing global commons problem.
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are globally-mixing pollutants, with 
emissions occurring anywhere across the globe resulting in the same
cumulative impact on atmospheric concentrations.6 Reductions in one 
jurisdiction will not address the global commons problem if other jurisdictions 
increase their emissions by an equal or greater amount.7 Mitigating climate 
change, therefore, requires emission reduction efforts by numerous high
 6. See Climate Change Indicators: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/UMF2­
EDZB] (last updated Feb. 22, 2016). 
7. See id.; see also Issue Brief: The Global Climate Change Regime: Scope of the 
Challenge, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate­
change-regime/p21831[https://perma.cc/2LYN-E55D] (last updated June 19, 2013) (“Fifteen 
to twenty countries are responsible for roughly 75 percent of global emissions, but no one 
country accounts for more than about 26 percent.”). 
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emitting countries, as well as efforts to prevent increased emissions from 
developing countries.
Past successes with emissions trading support the incorporation of
market-based measures into domestic and international climate policy 
negotiations. The Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, an early market-based 
approach capping of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants, 
resulted in considerably lower than anticipated regulatory costs.8 The U.S.
EPA subsequently implemented market-based systems to reduce nitrogen 
oxides emissions, regional haze in the Western U.S., and interstate impacts
caused by sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter emissions.9 
The Acid Rain Trading Program also provided a model for the EU ETS 
and GHG markets in other countries.10 
Market-based approaches are particularly well-suited for mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions. The primary concern with GHG emissions is 
the global impact rather than local or regional impact, allowing flexibility
with the location of emission reductions. Net reductions anywhere across 
the globe have the same relative benefit for atmospheric GHG concentrations.
Furthermore, by defining a standardized tradeable instrument (e.g., an
allowance representing the equivalent of a metric ton of CO2), emissions
markets offer the potential to harmonize emissions reductions policies across 
multiple jurisdictions. 
Market flexibility allows individual compliance entities to determine 
whether to reduce emissions at their facilities or search for lower-cost
emissions reduction options that could occur elsewhere. In that context, 
buyers and sellers can experience “gains from trade.” The seller of an 
emission allowance benefits by the revenue earned through the transaction. 
The buyer benefits by purchasing the allowance at a price that is lower 
than the cost of emissions abatement at the buyer’s own facility.11 From
an economic perspective, the most efficient emissions trading system has 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 114-327); Curtis Carlson
et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?, 108
J. POL. ECON. 1292, 1320 (2000); see also Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the 
Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69
(1998).
9. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 52, 78, 97 (2016) (The EPA also
attempted to implement a cap-and-trade approach to reducing mercury emissions from the 
power sector, but the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule for reasons unrelated to emissions 
trading.); see NOx Sip Call, 40 C.F.R. § 52 (1997); Regional Haze Regulations, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 51 (1999). 
10. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 13–14 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Curtis Carlson et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: 
What Are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1292 (2000) (describing the method 
of calculating gains from trade in emissions markets).
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one price that equates the marginal abatement cost across all emitting
sources, favoring a single cap and a multi-jurisdiction, multi-sector strategy 
to reduce emissions.12 
In the first decade of the 21st century, climate policy debates at both the
international and domestic levels focused on uniform, top-down market 
strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The movement toward
market-based climate policy in the U.S. started with the introduction of 
the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act in 2003.13 The bill included 
a national cap on GHG emissions covering specified sectors of the
economy and allowed these covered entities to trade emission allowances.
Senate sponsors introduced progressively more detailed legislative proposals 
to create a national cap-and-trade system in 2005 and 2007. These early
efforts focused attention on the complex policy tradeoffs associated with 
implementing a broad market system to limit GHG emissions and led to 
innovative regulatory design such as mechanisms that maintain the long­
term emissions cap while relieving short-term price pressure in the event 
of extreme allowance price volatility.14 
The high water mark for the U.S. carbon market debate occurred in 2009
when the House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy
and Security Act, introduced by Representatives Waxman and Markey
(Waxman-Markey bill). The bill included complex provisions creating a 
GHG cap-and trade system, including an emissions cap that declined on a 
specified schedule between 2012 and 2050, specific rules for allowance 
allocation and auctioning, mechanisms to protect energy-intensive industries 
whose competitiveness could be jeopardized by higher energy prices 
resulting from the carbon price, offsets provisions, and a market oversight
regime.15 The bill also included a federal renewable portfolio standard, 
energy efficiency incentives, and other policies to support energy innovation.16 
After a contentious debate, the bill passed the House of Representatives
by just three votes. The similar Boxer-Kerry-Lieberman bill stalled in the 
12. For an overview of criticisms regarding market-based climate policy, see
Nathaniel Keohane et al., Toward a Club of Carbon Markets, CLIMATIC CHANGE 3–4 (Oct. 
15, 2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-015-1506-z [https://perma.cc/MP64- 
UNRP]; see also Alice Kaswan, Justice in a Warming World, ENVTL. F., July/Aug. 2009,
at 48, 51, 58; Jonas J. Monast et al., On Morals, Markets, and Climate Change: Exploring
Pope Francis’ Challenge, Law & Contemporary Problems (publication forthcoming).
13.  Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003). 
14. Id. 
15.  American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
16. Id. 
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U.S. Senate in 2010,17 effectively halting congressional efforts to implement 
new federal legislation to mitigate climate change. 
International efforts to address climate change began in earnest with the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro and the resulting United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC).18 The convention implemented the principle
of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” distinguishing between
developed and developing countries.19 The agreement called upon developed 
countries to make binding commitments to reduce their respective GHG 
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol followed this bifurcated structure with 
emission reduction targets for developed countries, but no commitments 
for developing countries.20 The Kyoto Protocol implemented climate 
mitigation architecture for the initial period of 2008-12, with the U.N.
serving as the central body for monitoring compliance.21 
Although the Kyoto Protocol called upon countries to rely primarily on
national measures to meet their respective emission reduction targets, the
agreement established three flexible compliance mechanisms to facilitate 
market-based emissions abatement: international emissions trading, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI).22 
The latter two options fostered the first international offsets markets linked 
directly to compliance-based carbon markets. The CDM allowed developed
countries to fund emission reduction activities in developing countries and
receive certified emission reduction (CER) credits representing the equivalent
17. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill Effort, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010.
18. Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/
2631.php [https://perma.cc/29ES-LXKL] (last visited Jan 2, 2017). 
19. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
art. 10, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
20. Id. at Annex B (noting that the Kyoto Protocol lists developing countries with
asterisks in Annex B. The Annex B countries largely mirror the list of UNFCCC Annex I
member states). Compare UNFCCC, List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, with
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol. 
21. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, supra note 19. 
22. Id. at art. 6, 12, 17. 
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of one metric ton of CO2 (CO2e) each,23 while JI enabled cooperation
among developed countries, resulting in emission reduction units (ERUs).24 
The Kyoto Protocol met with limited success. The U.S. was a signatory 
but declined to ratify the agreement, due in part to the failure to impose 
emission reduction targets on all nations.25 Some countries, such as Canada
and Japan, signed on as parties to the agreement but did not meet their 
commitments.26 Canada subsequently withdrew from the Protocol altogether.27 
Furthermore, the CDM has been the subject of intense criticism due to 
lack of effective oversight, difficulty verifying that the CDM projects
resulted in additional emission reductions, and perverse incentives it creates 
for developing countries to increase emissions in order to attract emission
reduction investments.28 
The 2007 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Bali
sought to galvanize international efforts to complete a new legally binding 
international agreement.29 Negotiators agreed to the Bali Action Plan, a
series of steps intended to foster  a new legally-binding international agreement
by the 2009 Copenhagen COP. The Action Plan focused on establishing 
stronger commitments for developed countries and creating firm commitments 
for middle-income countries.30 
23.  Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco,
Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, 
as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/ 
13/Add.2, Decision 17/CP.7, (Jan. 21, 2002); Joint Implementation (JI), U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_ 
implementation/items/1674.php [https://perma.cc/S8VS-F3MP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
24. UNFCCC, Joint Implementation (2014), http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/
joint_implementation/items/1674.php [https://perma.cc/J7M7-NH94]. 
25. See, e.g., Greg Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush Administration, 
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548, 550 (2003). 
 26. Isabeau Doucet, Canada, the Surprise ‘Pariah’ of the Kyoto Protocol, THE GUARDIAN, 
Nov. 26, 2012. 
27. Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol, CBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2011; Andrew Light, 
Has Japan Killed the Kyoto Protocol?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS: ENERGY & ENV’T (Dec.
8, 2010, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2010/12/08/
8733/has-japan-killed-the-kyoto-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/HD4R-8AG3].
28. See, e.g., Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s 
Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1783–85 (2008). 
29. UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3­
15, 2007, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2007/6/ADD.1 (Mar. 
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The Copenhagen COP failed in its effort to replace the Kyoto Protocol 
with a more comprehensive agreement.31A number of factors contributed
to the diplomatic failure, including: the different views of the relative roles 
of developed versus developing nations, the sheer number of nations
negotiating with one another, and the difficulty simply agreeing on what 
global greenhouse gas concentration is necessary to avoid “dangerous” 
climate change.32 
While the Copenhagen COP did not achieve the grand international
agreement envisioned in the Bali Action Plan, negotiators were able to
salvage the UNFCCC process by reaching agreement on a limited set of 
steps. The Copenhagen Accord called upon individual countries to submit 
emission reduction targets to the UNFCCC, commit to the creation of an
international Green Climate Fund to support mitigation and adaptation efforts
in developing countries, and commit to continue negotiations through the 
UNFCCC process.33 The Copenhagen COP also resulted in progress on 
the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in
Developing Countries (REDD+) framework and agreement by the parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol to maintain a separate negotiating track aimed at 
extending the Protocol through 2020.34 
31. David G. Victor, Why the UN Can Never Stop Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN, 
Apr. 4, 2011 (noting how even before the Copenhagen COP, there were questions about 
the viability of a comprehensive, centralized global approach to climate change. As Professor
Victor puts it: “The United Nations forum is the wrong place for serious diplomacy. One 
of the chief strengths of the UN system—that it involves every nation on the planet – is a 
huge liability for global warming. By working in large groups, UN talks are often held 
hostage to the whims of even small players—as happened in Copenhagen and Cancún 
when Sudan and Bolivia and a few other nations whose emissions of warming pollution
are tiny. The UN system has also relied on legally binding agreements, which sound good
in theory yet have proved difficult to tailor and adjust in light of the many different
interests that must be reflected in any serious international pact to control emissions.”).
32. Keohane et al., supra note 12, at 14; Status of Ratification of the Convention, 
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php [https://perma.cc/MNK5-2H52] (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2017) (indicating there are 196 parties to the UNFCCC); see, e.g., Richard B.
Stewart et al., A New Strategy for Global Climate Protection, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 2
(2013).
33. See UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, Decision 
2/CP.1 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
34. See UNFCCC, Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating To Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation,
Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing
Countries, DECISION 4/CP.15 (Dec. 19, 2009). 
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III. CARBON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS POST-2009
The failure to implement a market-based approach through federal 
legislation in the U.S. and to reach a legally-binding international agreement 
at the Copenhagen COP dealt two potentially fatal blows to the prospect
of market-based climate policy, and effective climate policy more generally.35 
Multiple U.S. media outlets and think tanks declared the death of “cap­
and-trade.” Political opposition to  market-based climate policy persists
today.36 
Despite these high-profile setbacks, experimentation with carbon markets 
continued. Domestically, two state-based carbon markets launched in the 
United States between 2009 and 2012: the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), originally involving ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states,37 
and the California Cap-and-Trade Program.38 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency subsequently promulgated the Clean Power Plan, a 
rule limiting CO2 emission from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants.39 
Globally, “[c]arbon markets are now the largest class of environmental 
or emissions trading markets . . ., in terms of both market volume and 
35. Ezra Klein, Cap-and-Trade Is Dead, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, http://voices. 
washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/07/were_not_getting_a_price_on_ca.html [https://perma. 
cc/P7N8-7KMX]; Patrick J. Michaels, Cap-and-Trade Is Dead. Long Live Cap-and-Trade, 
TOWNHALL (Sept. 18, 2009), http://townhall.com/columnists/patrickjmichaels/2009/09/18/
cap-and-trade_is_dead_long_live_cap-and-trade/page/full [https://perma.cc/4XVV-EH2M];
Kimberley Strassel, Cap and Trade Is Dead, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2009, http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424052748703499404574558070997168360 [https://perma.cc/BQL6­
5CBB]; see, e.g., Nate Silver, Cap-and-Trade is Dead; Long Live Cap-and-Trade, FIVE 
THIRTY EIGHT (July 28, 2010), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/cap-and-trade-is/ [https://
perma.cc/TR6F-KMTK].
36. Bryan Walsh, Battle Brews Over EPA’s Emissions Regulations, TIME, Jan. 30,
2011, http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2040485,00.html [https://perma.cc/
S893-YNZW] (quoting then-EPA Assistant Administrator Gina McCarthy as stating that 
the forthcoming rules limiting CO2 emissions from existing power plants would be emissions
standards rather than a “[carbon] cap program” (inserted language in original)). 
37. Welcome, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org [https://perma. 
cc/T9GB-5MBL] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017); see discussion infra notes 157–59 (noting that 
New Jersey dropped out of RGGI in 2013). 
38. Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm [https://perma.cc/F2ZD-HCTB] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
39. Clean Power Plan for Existing Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants [https://perma.
cc/TAM4-ESQD] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
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market value, by a wide margin.”40 The EU ETS is the largest and longest
running carbon market.41 Norway and New Zealand have established carbon 
markets.42 South Korea launched a carbon market in 2015 and plans to
pursue linkage with the EU ETS.43 China and Canada are implementing a
national carbon market after experimentation at the provincial levels.44 
China’s new ETS will be the world’s largest carbon market, with the cap
potentially set at 4 billion tons—twice the size of the EU ETS and larger
“than all existing carbon markets combined.”45 In 2016, nations ratified
the Paris Agreement, which calls for individual nations to identify and pursue 
their own GHG emission reduction strategies.46 Diplomats also concluded 
two major sector-specific agreements to aid global GHG mitigation efforts:
an amendment to the Montreal Protocol phasing out the production and 
40. Richard G. Newell, et al., Carbon Markets 15 Years after Kyoto: Lessons Learned,
New Challenges, 27 J. ECON. PERS. 123, 124 (Winter 2013). 
41. Climate Action: The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUR. COMMISSION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en [https://perma.cc/6SAX-AUDE] (last updated Mar. 10,
2017).
42. Marion Afriat et al., New Zealand: An Emissions Trading Case Study, ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/new-zealand-case-study-may2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JAQ-3JLY] (last updated May 2015); see Anthony Mansell & Peter Sopher, 
Norway- The World’s Carbon Markets: A Case Study Guide to Emissions Training, ENVTL.
DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF_IETA_Norway_Case_Study May_2013. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/FC7P-U3TE] (last updated May 2013). 
43. Marion Afriat et al., Republic of Korea: An Emissions Trading Case Study, INT’L 
EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, https://ieta.wildapricot.org/resources/Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds 
_Carbon_Markets/republicofkorea_case%20study_june_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B2Q­
XXG4] (last updated June 2015). 
44. See Canada makes strides towards national carbon price by 2018, INT’L CTR.
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/
news/canada-makes-strides-towards-national-carbon-price-by-2018 [https://perma.cc/8D3X­
R4NK]; Karen Haugen-Kozyra, Alberta Climate Leadership: Building the Biological Bridge, 
INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/GHG_Report/ 
2016/Alberta%20Climate%20Leadership%20-%20KHaugen-Kozyra.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XBA7-87HY] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017); see also Afriat, supra note 42; Marion Afriat et 
al., Québec: An Emissions Trading Case Study, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, http:// 
www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/quebec_case
_study-may2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8SA-K9XP] (last updated May 2015); Kathy
Chen & Stian Reklev, China’s National Carbon Market to Start in 2016 –Official, REUTERS, 
Aug. 31, 2015.
45. Jeff Schwartz, China’s Emission Trading System: Implications for Carbon
Markets and Trade, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N 7 (Mar. 2016), http://www.ieta.org/ 
resources/China/Chinas_National_ETS_Implications_for_Carbon_Markets_and_Trade_I
CTSD_March2016_Jeff_Swartz.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT3N-X3XS].
46. U.N. Conferences of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/2015?L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/UF7L-85G4]; Press Release, John Kerry, The Paris Agreement to Enter 
Into Force, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 5, 2016) (on file with the author). 
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use of hydroflurocarbons (HFCs) and a new United Nations agreement to 
cap global aviation GHG emissions at the 2020 level.47 
Most of these developments represent unilateral policy measures that 
include market-based strategies. If these subnational or national efforts 
are to lead to multijurisdictional cooperation, policymakers will face the 
same design challenges as those described supra for top-down markets. 
These policymakers will also face additional layers of complexity associated 
with aligning market design choices, monitoring market actors and governmental 
entities, verifying the emission reductions occur, enforcement if malfeasance 
affects other jurisdictions, market oversight, offset policies, and cost
containment measures. Failure to adequately align these measures could 
undermine the integrity of the market, the environmental goals of the
system, or both.
This Part compares three policy approaches for limiting GHG emissions
implemented in the aftermath of the Waxman-Markey bill and the Copenhagen 
COP. At the subnational level, the California Cap-and-Trade Program
establishes a multi-sector emissions cap that declines over time. The California 
system includes express provisions regarding market linkage and currently 
operates as a linked market with the Canadian province of Quebec.
The EPA’s promulgation of the Clean Power Plan lays the foundation for 
multistate emissions trading as a compliance strategy. It is up to each state 
to determine whether to allow covered entities to trade, what instruments 
may trade, and whether to restrict trading partners. At the international
level, the UNFCCC process has shifted away from establishing member states’
emission reduction obligations through a single comprehensive agreement 
in favor of individual commitments by member states.48 The following 
discussion provides an overview of each approach and highlights the policy
choices that guide initial market design options. 
47. Press Statement, John Kerry, An Ambitious HFC Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 15, 2016); see also Joe Ryan, Airline Industry $24 Billion 
Emissions Pact Gets UN Approval, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2016-10-06/airline-climate-deal-on-path-to-adoption-approved-by­
committee [https://perma.cc/NCM3-7TUN]. 
48. The California market was under development prior to the Waxman-Markey
debate and the Copenhagen COP, but the market did not become operational until 2012. 
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A. The California Cap-and-Trade Program 
The RGGI market and the California Cap-and-Trade Program are prominent 
examples of subnational experimentation with carbon markets.49 Both 
efforts arose from state-level choices to limit CO2 emissions in the absence
of a federal requirement, but the two market systems evolved along different 
trajectories. While the RGGI states worked together to design the market
system and subsequently enacted state statutes to allow the simultaneous 
launch and coordinated operation of the regional market, California first 
implemented its law and subsequently sought linkage partners. The California
system provides a particularly useful lens through which to consider how 
initial design choices affect long-term development of the market. Furthermore,
the state could potentially serve as a linchpin for at least three domestic
and international markets through a linked market with Quebec, acceptance 
of international offsets, and the Clean Power Plan. 
1. State Policy Goals and Design Choices 
California’s carbon market originated with the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act of 2006, commonly referred to as “AB 32.”50 The 13-page
statute requires, inter alia, that the state reduce its emissions to 1990 levels
by 2020 and maintain and continue reductions beyond 2020. The law tasked
the state’s Air Resources Board with creating a scoping plan to “achiev[e] the
maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions from sources or categories of sources of greenhouse gases by
2020” and allowed the Board to implement “market-based compliance 
mechanisms” to comply with the regulations promulgated under the law.51 
California officials sought to use the AB 32 framework to create a model for 
addressing climate change for other states, and potentially the federal
government, to follow.52
 49. See RGGI, Inc., REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/ 
rggi [https://perma.cc/X7LA-ZLLH] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017); see also Marion Afriat et 
al., California: An Emissions Trading Case Study, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, http://
www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/california_ca
se_study-may2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NXF-LBU9] (last updated Apr. 2015). 
50. Assemb. B. 32, Ch. 488 (Cal. 2006) [hereinafter AB 32]; see also CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West, WestlawNext through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); Assembly
Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
ab32/ab32.htm [https://perma.cc/5VM6-92GE]. 
51. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550, 38570 (West, WestlawNext through
Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
52. Samantha Young, California adopts sweeping climate plan, SEATTLE PI (Dec.
11, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/national/article/California-adopts-sweeping-climate­
plan-1294584.php [https://perma.cc/8ZFU-XJJD] (mentioning that Republican Governor 
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The California Cap-and-Trade Program launched in 2012, initially
covering electric utilities and large industrial facilities emitting more than 
25,000 metric tons of CO2 annually.53 Beginning in 2015, distributers of 
transportation fuels and natural gas became subject to the emissions cap,
covering major emitting sectors that account for 85 percent of the state’s 
emissions.54 The emissions cap is slated to decline approximately three 
percent per year between 2015-2020.55 
California relies on imported electricity to meet approximately one-
quarter of its demand, a major portion of which is supplied by coal-fired 
power plants.56 State officials addressed the prospect of emissions leakage
by requiring the first in-state purchaser of imported electricity to submit
allowances for the CO2 emissions associated with the generation.57 This
policy approach avoids a Commerce Clause challenge while still imposing 
consistent requirements on all electricity providers, thereby removing the 
incentive to increase imports to avoid a carbon price.58 
The California system includes a number of mechanisms intended to 
minimize compliance costs. First, the Air Resources Board points to the
market-based system itself as a means of controlling costs.59 Second, covered 
entities may use offset credits to meet up to eight percent of their respective
Arnold Schwarzenegger said “he believes the regulations will spur the state’s economy
and serve as a model for the rest of the country.”). 
53. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD 1 




56. California Energy Almanac, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
almanac/ [https://perma.cc/RC2P-R29L] (last visited Dec. 30, 2016); Editors, California 
Must Import One-Quarter of Its Electricity, REALCLEAR ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/01/30/california_must_import_one-quarter_
of_its_electricity.html [https://perma.cc/4CH2-ZDU9].
57. See Allocating Emissions Allowances Under a California Cap-and-Trade
Program: Recommendations to the California Air Resources Board and the California 
Environmental Protection Agency, ECON. & ALLOCATION ADVISORY COMMISSION (Mar.
2010), http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/eaac/documents/eaac_reports/2010-03-22_EAAC_ 
Allocation_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FG3-AQJM].
58. For a discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause issues related to the California
market, see, e.g., James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1357, 1369 (2014); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and
the Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653 (2007). 
59. AB 32, supra note 50, at Legislative Counsel’s Digest; Overview of ARB Emissions
Trading Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2JE-LWXT].
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compliance obligations.60 As of 2016, the California market only accepts 
five categories of U.S.-based offsets: forest projects, livestock projects,
ozone depleting substances, mine methane capture, and rice cultivation 
projects.61 California officials are evaluating additional offset categories,
including international offsets.62 The state has entered into memoranda of 
understanding with the governments of Chiapas, Mexico and Acre, Brazil.63 
These steps could lead to acceptance of credits generated by the REDD+
program developed through the UNFCCC process.64 Third, the market
system seeks to minimize the impacts of yearly fluctuations in electricity
demand and hydropower availability through multi-year compliance periods
and by allowing market participants to bank allowances for use during a 
later compliance period.65 
Fourth, the California market includes an allowance reserve pool to
mitigate price spikes.66 Allowances in the reserve pool are offered at a
predetermined price at quarterly auctions.67 Market participants may purchase 
allowances from the reserve pool at quarterly auctions, thereby adding to
the total pool of allowances available in the marketplace.68 These cost 
containment provisions are coupled with an auction price floor to maintain 
a minimum price signal. Together, these provisions represent value choices
 60. Compliance Offset Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/
cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm [https://perma.cc/E7LN-6J6W] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
61. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95854 (WestlawNext through 3/10/17 Register 2017, 
No. 10).
62. Cal. Air Resource Board Resolution 13-7: Amendments to California Cap-and-
Trade Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
capandtrade/linkage/resolution13-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHN2-QWFV] (noting that the 
California carbon market program “establishes a mechanism to include international offset 
programs from an entire sector within a region.”).
63. Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation Between the 
State of Acre of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the State of Chiapas of the United 
Mexican States, and the State of California of the United States of America, CAL. AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD (2010), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/sectorbasedoffsets/
2010%20MOU%20Acre-California-Chiapas.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJS6-EJ5Y] (noting a 
prospect of accepting REDD credits). 
64. UNFCCC, Decision 9/CP.19, Work Programme on Results-Based Finance to 
Progress the Full Implementation of the Activities Referred to in Decision 1/CP.16, 
Paragraph 70 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#
page=24 [https://perma.cc/S5TN-SVVU].
65. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(Feb. 9. 2015), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66GM-DP5P].
66. Id. 
67. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95911(d)(1) (WestlawNext through 3/10/17 Register
2017, No. 10).
68. Auction and Reserve Sale Information, CAL.AIRRESOURCESBOARD, http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/auction.htm [https://perma.cc/P75X-BZV2] (last visited Mar. 
14, 2017). 
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that the market price should be high enough to incentivize investments 
intended to reduce emissions, while also controlling for higher than anticipated
allowance prices.69 
Not content with relying solely on the market price to spur investments, 
California combines the market system with additional policies affecting
the production and consumption of energy. For example, California has one 
of the most aggressive renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) in the country, 
requiring investor-owned utilities, electricity service providers, and community
choice aggregators to procure 33 percent of their total electricity from qualifying
renewable energy resources by 2020.70 In 2015, California lawmakers adopted
a new law setting the RPS requirement at 50 percent by 2030.71 
The California Cap and Trade Program distributes allowances through
a combination of free allocation, auctions, and the allowance reserve.
Recipients of free allowances vary depending on the sector. Industrial 
facilities receive their share of allowances directly.72 Allowances for the
electric power sector and natural gas fuels go to electric distribution utilities 
and natural gas distributors, respectively, and these entities must use the
value of the allowances to achieve emission reductions and benefit ratepayers.73 
Furthermore, the state sought to ensure transparency and avoid market
manipulation through market oversight mechanisms governing the transfer
of allowances.74 
2. Market Linkage 
The design of the California market system occurred in parallel with 
efforts to design a regional carbon market through the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI). At its height, the WCI included seven U.S. states and
 69. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95911(b)(6)(A), 95913(d)(2) (WestlawNext through
3/10/17 Register 2017, No. 10). 
70. RPS Program Overview, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://cpuc.ca.gov/ RPS_
Overview/ [https://perma.cc/MG9F-WPRG] (last visited Mar.14, 2017). For information 
about other states RPS requirements, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables &
Efficiency, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., http://www.dsireusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/ 
KP9R-PAJH] (last visited Mar.23, 2017). 
71. SB350 Clean Energy and Reduction Act of 2015, Chapter 547, https://leginfo. 
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB350 [https://perma.cc/
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four Canadian provinces.75 Together, these subnational jurisdictions
developed a coordinated set of design recommendations for a regional 
cap-and-trade program, including: the scope of the program,76 the emissions
threshold for entities subject to the emissions cap,77 the regional emissions 
cap and how it would be apportioned among the WCI partner jurisdictions,78 
provisions for program expansion,79 distribution of allowances,80 the use
of offset credits,81 monitoring and reporting requirements,82 enforcement 
provisions,83 and linkage.84 The WCI market did not materialize, but the
California system incorporates many aspects from the WCI process.
The California program expressly contemplates market linkage. California 
regulations require the governor to make the following findings before the 
state may link its carbon market with another jurisdiction:
(1) 	 The jurisdiction with which the state agency proposes to link has adopted
program requirements for greenhouse gas reductions, including, but not 
limited to, requirements for offsets that are equivalent to or stricter than
those required by [California law].
(2) 	 Under the proposed linkage, the State of California is able to enforce [its 
laws] against any entity subject to regulation under those statutes, and
against any entity located within the linking jurisdiction to the maximum 
extent permitted under the United States and California Constitutions. 
(3) 	 The proposed linkage provides for enforcement of applicable laws by the 
state agency or by the linking jurisdiction of program requirements that are 
equivalent to or stricter than those required [by California law]. 
75. U.S. state partners included Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington. Design Recommendations for the WCI Regional Cap-and-Trade
Program, WCI Appendix A (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/ 
WCI-1000-2008-025/WCI-1000-2008-025.PDF [https://perma.cc/SM82-QMCS] [hereinafter
WCI Design Recommendations]. Canadian partners included British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario, and Quebec. Id.  The following Canadian provinces, U.S. States, and Mexican
states participated in the WCI process as observers: Saskatchewan, Alaska, Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming, Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon,
Sonora, and Tamaulipas. Id. at i.
 76. WCI Design Recommendations, supra note 75, at 1–3. 
77. Id. at 3.  The recommended emissions threshold was 25,000 tons of CO2 equivalent 
(CO2e) per year.  Id.
 78. Id. at 4–7. The WCI sought to achieve a 15% reduction in CO2e emissions below
2005 levels by 2020.  Program Design, WCI, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/
designing-the-program [https://perma.cc/Z4F5-4J57] (last visited Mar. 23, 2017). 
79. WCI Design Recommendations, supra note 75, at 3. 
80. Id. at 7–10. 
81. Id. at 12. 
82. Id.
 83. Id. at 12–13. 
84. Id. at 13–14. 
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(4) 	 The proposed linkage and any related participation of the State of California 
in Western Climate Initiative, Incorporated, shall not impose any significant
liability on the state or any state agency for any failure associated with the
linkage.85 
On October 1, 2013, the governments of California and Quebec formally 
linked their respective carbon markets.86 In April 2015, the Ontario 
Premier announced that the province would join the linked carbon market, 
although California has not taken formal steps to facilitate the process as 
of October 2016.87 To date, no other WCI participants have announced 
plans to pursue linkage with California. 
Allowing offset credits into the California market also creates the
potential for indirect market linkage with other jurisdictions accepting the 
same credits. If multiple markets accept the same offset credits, the offset
provider will sell credits in the market with the higher allowance prices.88 
B. U.S. Clean Air Act 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan creates
the potential for a national emissions trading system to emerge in the 
United States. In contrast to the explicit market design choices at the heart
of the California Cap-and-Trade Program, however, prospects for carbon
trading under the Clean Air Act depend on implementation choices by 47 
states.89  This subpart discusses the Clean Power Plan as it exists at the time
 85. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West, WestlawNext through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
86. Agreement Between the California Air Resources Board and The Gouvernment 
Du Québec, Concerning: The Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Sept. 25-27, 2013), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/567H-47JW]. 
87. News Release: Cap and Trade System to Limit Greenhouse Gas Pollution in 
Ontario: Provincial System will Reward Innovative Companies and Create More Opportunities
for Investment in Ontario, OFF. PREMIER ONT., CAN. (Apr. 13, 2015), https://news.ontario.ca/
opo/en/2015/04/cap-and-trade-system-to-limit-greenhouse-gas-pollution-in-ontario.html
[https://perma.cc/7B4T-JRTK]; see also Allison Martell & Mike De Souza, Ontario
Confirms It Will Join Quebec, California in Carbon Market, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-canada-idUSKBN0N41X220150413 
[https://perma.cc/LA5Y-B4NJ]. 
88. See, e.g., Daniel M. Bodansky et al., Faculty Research Working Paper Series,
Facilitating Linkage of Heterogeneous Regional, National, and Sub-National Climate 
Policies Through a Future International Agreement, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. (Jan. 2015). 
89. See Clean Power Plan- State Specific Fact Sheets, U.S.ENVTL.PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplantoolbox/clean-power-plan-state-specific-fact-sheets 
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of publication. Although the Trump Administration has taken initial steps 
to overturn the rule, the rule development process and the market-based
approaches included in the final version of the rule offer important lessons 
for future climate policy efforts. The subpart begins by summarizing the 
Clean Air Act provisions underlying the rule, and then explores the rule’s 
emissions trading options and the tradeoffs that may impact the emergence
and expansion of markets under this regulatory framework.90 
1. CO2 Performance Standards for the Electric Power Sector 
While the House of Representatives debated the Waxman-Markey bill
in 2009, the EPA was in the early stages of regulating GHG emissions under 
the Clean Air Act. In 2007, the Supreme Court determined that the Clean
Air Act’s definition of “pollutant” applied to GHGs, thereby requiring the 
EPA to determine whether the gases endanger public health and welfare.91 
The EPA made such a finding in 2009, which triggered implementation 
of a suite of new regulations to limit GHG emissions from motor vehicles
and stationary sources.92 
The EPA promulgated performance standards limiting CO2 emissions 
from the electric power sector pursuant to Clean Air Act Section 111. That 
section of the Act instructs the EPA to define categories of stationary
sources emitting air pollutants that “cause, or contribute[] significantly to, 
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” then develop performance standards for new or modified sources
emitting those pollutants.93 According to the EPA’s interpretation, Section 
111 also applies to existing stationary sources in the rare circumstance 
when (1) a pollutant is regulated under section 111, (2) the existing source 
falls within a source category also regulated under section 111, and (3) the air
pollutant in question is neither regulated under the National Ambient Air 
[https://perma.cc/N82X-Z56M] (last updated Sept. 16, 2016 at 6:00 PM EDT) (demonstrating
that states that the Clean Power Plan does not apply to Alaska Hawaii or Vermont, as fact
sheets are not available for those states).
90. On September 28, 2016, the D.C. Circuit held oral arguments in a case challenging
numerous aspects on the Clean Power Plan. West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. argued Sept. 28, 2016).  Although the outcome of the litigation is unknown, the rule’s 
trading provisions provide a useful lens through which to consider bottom-up market
developments.
91. Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S., 497, 528 (2007). 
92. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings Under Section 202(a) of the Clean
Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (proposed Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
93. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7411(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 114­
327). 
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Quality Standards or Hazardous Air Pollutant programs.94 Carbon dioxide
emissions from existing fossil fuel–fired power plants meet these criteria.
Flexible performance standards lie at the heart of Section 111, which the 
statute defines as
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any
non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the 
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.95 
Section 111(d) embraces the cooperative federalism structure that is 
common in environmental statutes. Under the law, the EPA develops guidance 
for the states, approves or denies the state plans, and may issue federal 
performance standards in the event a state plan is deemed insufficient.96 It 
is the states, however, that have the primary responsibility for developing 
the performance standards for existing sources through a process “similar
to” those provided for developing state implementation plans for NAAQS
standards.97 Unlike the requirements for new and modified sources, Section 
111(d) does not require a uniform national standard, allowing states to
develop tailored plans for the existing sources within their borders.98 
There is little regulatory precedent that applies Section 111(d) and no 
direct judicial precedent interpreting the section’s broad statutory language.99 
The EPA has previously interpreted the statute to allow emissions averaging 
or trading among covered sources rather than requiring action at each covered 
source; however, these rules cover a much smaller and less heterogeneous
group of sources than the Clean Power Plan.100 Petitioners challenging the
Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), issued pursuant to Section 111(b)
and Section 111(d), argued that the statute requires continuous emissions 
94. Id. § (d)(1).  Litigants are challenging the third criterion based on a discrepancy
in unresolved versions of section 111(d) included in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
95.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(1). 
96. Publication of guideline documents, emission guidelines, and final compliance 
times, 40 C.F.R. 60.22 (2017). 
97.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(d)(1). 
98. Id. § (b), (d).
99. Jonas Monast et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: 
Section 111(d) and State Equivalency, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 1026 (2012). 
100. See Emission Guidelines for Municipal Waste Combustor Metals, Acid Gases, 
Organics, and Nitrogen Oxides, 40 C.F.R. § 60.33b(d) (2017). 
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reductions at every source subject to the rule.101 The court overturned the
rule for other reasons and did not address the range of options available to 
the EPA under Section 111(d).102 
2. Clean Power Plan Overview
On August 3, 2015, the U.S. EPA finalized new source performance
standards (NSPS) governing CO2 emissions from new and modified power 
plants that fall within two source categories: steam electricity generating 
units (i.e., coal-fired and oil-fired units) and electricity generation turbines 
(i.e., natural gas-fired turbines). The release of the NSPS triggered the 
Section 111(d) provisions, and the EPA simultaneously released the Clean
Power Plan covering CO2 emissions from existing power plants.103 
The final Clean Power Plan identified three categories of emissions 
reduction strategies, or “building blocks,” that together form the best
system of emissions reduction: (1) improving efficiency at existing fossil 
fuel-fired steam units (i.e., coal-fired and oil-fired power plants), (2) increasing
use of existing natural gas combined cycle turbines, and (3) incremental
growth of renewable energy generation.104 The rule applies these building 
blocks to the fleet of existing fossil fuel-fired power plants in each state,
resulting in state-specific emission limits.105 
States have broad discretion to determine how to meet their emissions
targets, and the compliance strategies available to them extend beyond
those included in the building blocks used to calculate state goals.106 As a
threshold matter, states may choose between a rate-based target (pounds 
of CO2 per megawatt hour of generation) and a mass-based target (tons of 
CO2). The states may then assign the emission rate targets or tonnage 
limits to each affected unit, or may rely on a combination of state energy
policies and actions taken by power plant operators to achieve the overall
101. Final Brief of Environmental Petitioners at 27, New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d
574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) No. 05-1097, 2007 WL 2155491.
102. New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
103. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662-01 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), 2015 WL 6384905 [hereinafter Final CPP Rule].  For an overview of 
Section 111(d), see Jeremy Tarr, The Clean Air Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards:
Basics of Section 111(d), DUKE NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS (Mar. 13,
2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36NY-E56E].
104.  Final CPP Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64667. 
105. Id. 
106. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(d) (stating that section 111(d) grants states the authority
to “establish standards of performance” and “provide[] for the implementation and enforcement”
of those standards). 
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state emission goal.107 The EPA’s final rule also identifies several options
for states to allow covered entities to trade emission credits under a mass-
based or a rate-based approach, and streamlines implementation of “trading- 
ready” state plans through two proposed model rules.108 
3. Market-Based Clean Power Plan Compliance Options 
The evolution of market-based options under the Clean Power Plan
reflects the Obama Administration’s cautious initial approach to carbon 
markets in the aftermath of the failed effort to move climate legislation 
through Congress. Early in the rule development process, the EPA sought
to deflect claims that it was seeking to impose a national cap-and-trade
system through the Clean Air Act—essentially accomplishing through
regulation what supporters of climate legislation could not accomplish in 
Congress.109 Rather than streamlining the development of a market-based 
approach by offering states a model rule that they could voluntarily submit 
as their state plan—the approach used in CAMR110—the Agency instead 
offered four regulatory pathways from which each state could choose.111 
Two of those pathways allowed states to incorporate market-based
compliance into their Clean Power Plan plans: a pathway allowing states
to jointly develop a multistate trading system and a pathway whereby a
state could submit an individual state plan that incorporated an intrastate
107.  Final CPP Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 64664. 
108. Id. at 64734. 
109. Obama Administration Pushing ‘Backdoor’ Cap-and-Trade Tax, NEWSMAX
(Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/obama-cap-and-trade/2010/12/30/id/ 
381453/ [https://perma.cc/8AU2-G5VV]; see, e.g., Geoffrey Stiles, Does EPA’s CO2 Rule
Open A Back Door to Cap & Trade?, ENERGY TRENDS INSIDER (June 12, 2014), http://www.
energytrendsinsider.com/2014/06/12/does-epas-co2-rule-open-a-back-door-to-cap-trade/ 
[https://perma.cc/MLC8-2JTA]. 
110. New Jersey v. E.P.A., 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
111. The pathways included an EGU-specific approach, a portfolio approach, a state 
commitment approach, and a multistate approach.  Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830­
01, 34,900-02, 34,910-12 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60)
[hereinafter Proposed Clean Power Plan].  For an overview of each state option included in the
Proposed Clean Power Plan, see Lissa Lynch et al., Clean Power Plan Implementation:
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market.112 RGGI and the California Cap-and-Trade Program could qualify 
under these respective options. 
The proposed Clean Power Plan highlighted the tension between the
economic benefits of a multistate market-based approach and the political
and administrative hurdles to creating state-based emissions markets.
Economic modeling of the proposed rule suggested that on average 
compliance costs would be lower under a multistate approach, whether it
be rate-based or mass-based.113 Despite the potential to reduce overall
compliance costs, developing state or regional markets presented political 
and administrative hurdles that raised questions about the viability of 
market approaches for many states.114 The notion of a cap-and-trade system
to limit GHG emissions remains a politically controversial proposition.115 
State officials, therefore, may face significant opposition from others within 
state government if they propose designing a market system to comply
with the Clean Power Plan. 
While the prospect of developing a market system for an individual
state may have seemed politically infeasible, the additional requirement
that states negotiate with one another in order to develop a multistate 
market made it even less likely that states would choose that option. Such 
a process would require the states to agree on a unified set of design
features and could have exacerbated attention on the state’s role in
implementing a politically contentious carbon market.116 Furthermore,
some states faced lower projected compliance costs than others, creating
the concern that cooperation would raise energy prices in the lower cost
states. Despite potential gains from trade bringing economic benefits to
 112. See Lynch et al., supra note 111, at 4. 
113.  Martin T. Ross et al., Assessing Impacts of the Clean Power Plan on Southeast 
States (Duke Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper NI WP 15-03, 2015), 
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_15-03_full_pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9U5-WAU3]; see also Jennifer Macedonia et al., Insights from Modeling
the Proposed Clean Power Plan, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. 5 (Apr. 2015), http://bipartisan 
policy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BPC-Clean-Power-Plan-Slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CZ2D-PFYH] (“Adopting policy designs that allow access to emission reduction opportunities 
in other states tends to significantly lower the cost of compliance and reduce [power plant] 
retirements.”); Martin T. Ross et al., The Clean Power Plan: Implications of Three Compliance
Decisions for U.S. States 1 (Duke Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper 
NI WP 15-02, 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_ 
wp_15-02_full_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLW6-Y89W] (“[A] mass-based approach, especially
with multistate cooperation, offers large cost savings opportunities.”). 
114. Jonas Monast et al., Enhancing Compliance Flexibility under the Clean Power Plan: 
A Common Elements Approach to Capturing Low-Cost Emissions Reductions, DUKE
NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS 2 (Mar. 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_15-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C53W-KFQ5]. 
115. Id. at 3. 
116. Id. 
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the lower cost state, the prospect of potentially raising costs and the complexity 
associated with evaluating potential gains from trade, contributed to the 
political infeasibility of the multistate option provided for in the proposed
rule.117 
During the proposal phase, a handful of organizations released white
papers demonstrating the potential for additional pathways that would allow
multistate emissions markets to emerge without requiring state officials to
affirmatively develop the markets or negotiate with their counterparts in 
other states.118 These strategies, referred to as “common elements,”119 
“trading-ready,”120 and “opt-in” compliance systems,121 highlighted the
potential for states to streamline the requirements for trading by incorporating 
similar provisions in their respective plans. At minimum, states wishing 
to pursue this approach would need to allow the use of tradable instruments 
for compliance, adopt a common definition for the instruments (e.g., an 
allowance representing one ton of CO2), and include provisions for a tracking
system to ensure that the instrument meets the state’s criteria and protects
117. Carolyn Fischer et al., Using Emissions Trading to Regulate U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions; Part 1 of 2: Basic Policy Design and Implementation Issues, RESOURCES
FOR FUTURE 4 (June 1998), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/ 
RFF-CCIB-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GK3-87FS] (“[G]ains from trade refers to the possibility
of those with higher cost of abatement paying those with lower cost of abatement to undertake 
more emission control. Those with higher costs benefit by reducing their net cost 
of compliance – they pay others to undertake emission control, but they avoid even higher
costs of controlling themselves. Those with lower costs benefit because they voluntarily
enter into transactions that yield revenues at least as large as the extra control costs they
assume. And society benefits by having a more cost-effective control program – fewer real 
resources devoted to the achievement of the environmental goal.”); see also Monast et al., 
supra note 114, at 3 (“[S]tates anticipating lower compliance costs than their neighbors 
may be reluctant to allow interstate trading out of concern for higher electricity rates for
their citizens.”).
118. Kathryn Zyla et al., Working Paper: Supporting State Plan Compatibility and 
Interstate Compliance with the Clean Power Plan, GEO. CLIMATE CTR. (July 2015), 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/GCC_InterstateCompatibility_July2015_
0-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVQ8-AAJ5]; see also Franz T. Litz & Jennifer Macedonia, 
Choosing a Policy Pathway for State 111(d) Plans to Meet State Objectives (April 2015), 
http://www.betterenergy.org/sites/default/files/Policy%20Pathways%20Paper.pdf  [https://perma.
cc/45TM-6R59]; Monast et al., supra note 114. 
119.  Monast et al., supra note 114, at 2. 
120. Franz T. Litz & Jennifer Macedonia, Choosing a Policy Pathway for State 111(d) 
Plans to Meet State Objectives: Implementation Elements for a Trading-Ready Rate-Based 
Plan (May 2015), http://www.betterenergy.org/sites/default/files/Rate%20Trading%20
Ready_0.pdf  [https://perma.cc/B9W3-ADX2].
121. Zyla et al., supra note 118, at 2.
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against “double-counting” (e.g., previously submitted for compliance by
any entity with a compliance obligation).122 
The final Clean Power Plan rule embraces this approach to market-based 
compliance flexibility, expressly identifying “trading-ready” compliance 
pathways for either a mass-based or rate-based approach.123 The rule 
emphasizes that a mass-based approach provides a more straightforward
option for the trading-ready system due to the simplicity of defining the tradable 
compliance instrument—a short ton of CO2.124 States implementing a
mass-based trading-ready option must either incorporate new fossil fuel-
fired power plants in the trading system or implement other mechanisms
to mitigate the potential “leakage” of emissions from existing units covered 
by the Clean Power Plan to new units that are not.125 The numerous
trading-ready pathways under the mass-based approach allow a common
market to evolve even if states make different choices regarding allowance 
allocation, the treatment of new units, and other market design features. 
The options for a rate-based trading-ready approach are more limited 
due to the complexity involved in defining tradable instruments based on
heat rate efficiency. The only trading-ready rate-based pathway identified
in the rule requires that states maintain the subcategorized rates for natural
gas turbines and steam units (i.e., requiring natural gas units and steam 
units to meet the heat rate standard for their respective categories—771 
and 1,305 pounds per megawatt hour for gas units and for steam units,
respectively). States wishing to combine the two standards into a single 
“blended” state rate may only allow multistate trading with other states
that also choose a blended rate approach, and then only if the blended rate 
states agreed to a single target that averaged each state’s target. The EPA
released two proposed model rules to streamline incorporation of the
trading-ready options, one based on a mass-based trading-ready approach 
and the other based on a rate-based trading-ready approach.126 
The trading-ready approach allows states to submit Clean Power Plan
plans that preserve a power plant operator’s ability to participate in an
emissions market if doing so would be the most cost-effective compliance
122. If market-based compliance is permissible under the language of Clean Air Act 
section 111(d)—an issue that was briefed in the CAMR litigation but not addressed by the 
court—the statute itself would not restrict this option although it was unclear whether the 
proposal was permitted under the proposed rule.  42 U.S.C.A. § 7411. 
123. Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility
Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules;
Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 64966, 65110 (proposed Oct. 23, 
2015) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 60, 62, 78), 2015 WL 6384950. 
124. Id. at 64970. 
125. Id. at 64977–64978. 
126. Id. at 64985. 
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option, but does not require the states to endorse the approach or engage 
in the resource-intensive process of designing the market or negotiating 
with other states.127 
4. Clean Power Plan Market Design Tradeoffs 
The trading-ready pathways included in the Clean Power Plan represent 
a hybrid approach to market development, with elements of both a top-
down, rules-based approach, as well as a diffuse, bottom-up approach.128 
States have broad discretion to choose among a range of compliance strategies, 
including whether or not to allow trading and, if so, what tradable instruments
may satisfy covered entities’ compliance obligations. Unlike the RGGI 
system, which is an example of a top-down approach with subnational
jurisdictions working together to develop uniform policies necessary to
establish a regional market,129 the EPA made key policy choices that
requires action at the state level, yet constrains their choices. Most
importantly, the EPA identifies the emission target for each state.130 As 
described above, the EPA’s rule also constrains the range of options regarding 
tradable instruments. 
The Clean Power Plan’s hybrid approach to market development has its 
benefits. First, all existing electric generating units are subject to a carbon 
constraint. A mandatory emission limit ensures actions will occur that 
achieve the environmental policy goal. While intense political opposition 
remains, the Clean Power Plan spurred state regulators to focus attention 
on strategies to regulate carbon emissions, leading to a renewed interest in 
market-based approaches. Combining the top-down mandatory emission
limit with a flexible regulatory program with a range of potential compliance 
127. Id. at 64969. 
128. Id. at 64975–64976. 
129. To avoid Compact Clause challenges, each state participating in RGGI adopted
its own legislation creating the program. Platform and User Information, REGIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GASINITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/tracking/coats-platform [https://perma.cc/ 
EF7Z-LWLQ] (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).  Each state’s legislation was based on model 
legislation developed in conjunction with other RGGI states, and included consistent rules
necessary for the regional market to operate effectively, including the emissions cap, trading 
provisions, use of offsets, and allowance distribution. Id.
130. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64961 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60), 2015 WL 6384905. 
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pathways allows individual jurisdictions—here state governments—to
evaluate which strategies are most likely to achieve state policy goals.131 
This decentralized approach to policy implementation may alleviate
some of the political hurdles to market-based climate policy. The promulgation 
of the rule shifted the policy debate from whether to limit emissions, to
how. By granting states the option to incorporate market-based options in 
their state plans, it allows an assessment of the value of markets in this 
context. The trading-ready approach could also have the long-term benefit 
of facilitating a trading infrastructure that can incorporate additional sectors
and expand into a unified national system. 
The trading-ready concept facilitates state choices and may mitigate 
some degree of political controversy regarding market-based compliance 
because the EPA is allowing, rather than imposing, market-based compliance
options. However, allowing the states to decide whether to allow emissions 
trading could result in a more expensive and administratively complex
approach to national emission reductions than a single, coordinated market 
strategy. 
Despite the potential downsides to the bottom-up decision-making process, 
created by allowing states to choose among numerous trading ready pathways, 
the EPA’s focus on the minimal criteria necessary to allow market-based
compliance offers a useful model for national and international efforts to 
foster broad cooperation on emission reduction goals. As discussed in Part 
IV, the trading ready approach may facilitate market linkage over time by
streamlining key market design choices. 
C. UNFCCC Focus on Unilateral Commitments 
The UNFCCC negotiations continued to focus on a post-2020 agreement 
in the aftermath of the Copenhagen COP, but sought alternatives to
the uniform, top-down approach. In 2011, the Durban COP produced
a “platform for enhanced action” that established a “blueprint for a fresh
universal, legal agreement to deal with climate change beyond 2020,
where all will play their part to the best of their ability.”132 The process 
leading up to the Paris COP settled on a decentralized, bottom-up process 
whereby each member country identified its individual emission reduction 
131. Common state energy goals include maintaining affordable energy prices, but 
may also include efforts to promote specific energy options, or steer benefits to certain
industries or consumers through allowance allocation strategies or auction proceeds. 
132.  Framework Convention on Climate Change dec. 1/CP.17, Mar. 15, 2012, U.N. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add. 1 [hereinafter Durban Platform]; Towards full Implementation of
the UN Climate Change Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7EZ-6V4N] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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strategies through Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
submitted to the UNFCCC.133 In addition to the emission reduction
targets, the INDCs also included the means to implement and enforce the
policies, as well as measures covering adaptation, finance, and funding to 
address climate change-related damages in developing countries.134 
The UNFCCC members agreed to a long-term goal of stabilizing global 
emissions to limit temperature rise to no more than 2° Celsius above pre­
industrial levels and committed to “pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5° Celsius.”135 The Paris Agreement calls for emissions neutrality 
by the end of the 21st Century, with a “balance between anthropogenic emissions 
and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases.”136 The agreement codified 
the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) approach, requiring the 
parties to update their NDCs every five years.137 
Similar to the U.S. EPA’s actions under the Clean Air Act, the post-
Copenhagen UNFCCC process relies on individual countries to determine
whether and how to pursue multilateral cooperation. Unlike the U.S. 
regulatory approach, however, the Paris Agreement lacks an overarching 
policy identifying the emissions limits for member nations and uniform 
oversight and enforcement provisions.138 
133. Framework Convention on Climate Change dec. 1/CP.19 (Jan. 31, 2014), U.N. 
FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add. 1, http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php [https://perma.cc/ 
D8Q2-HR2A].
134.  Durban Platform, supra note 132. 
135. Paris Agreement art. 2.1(a), 2015, U.N. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, (Analysis of 
the INDC submissions demonstrate that additional measures will be necessary to achieve 
the 1.5-2°C goal.); see, e.g., John Reilly et al., Energy & Climate Outlook Perspectives
from 2015, MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON SCI. & POL’Y GLOBAL CHANGE 2 (2015), https://
globalchange.mit.edu/sites/default/files/newsletters/files/2015%20Energy%20%26%20C
limate%20Outlook.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N7B-F574] (“Under the proposed cuts, the 
emissions path far exceeds levels consistent with the 2°C goal often used as a target in 
climate negotiations as a  level necessary to prevent dangerous climate change.”); The 
Emissions Gap Report 2015: A UNEP Synthesis Report, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (NOV.
2015), https://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/EGR_2015_301115_lores.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/X9NT-VV74]. 
136. Paris Agreement, supra note 135, at art. 4.1. 
137. Id. at art. 4.2, 4.9.  Parties agreed to “prepare, communicate and maintain successive 
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic 
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.” Id. 
at art. 4.2.
 138. See, e.g., Joseph Aldy, The Role of Domestic Policy Surveillance in the Multilateral
Climate Transparency Regime, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND BEYOND: INT’L CLIMATE 
CHANGE POL’Y POST-2020 43–46 (2016) (discussing the importance of domestic transparency
 203
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The Paris Agreement offers two options for multilateral market-based
mitigation strategies: The first allows parties to voluntarily engage in
“cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes towards [NDCs], to promote sustainable development
and to ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in
governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting.”139 This provision could include numerous
options for bilateral or multilateral emission trading programs.140 
The second option establishes an emission mitigation and sustainable 
development mechanism that does not depend upon emissions trading
systems. The Agreement requires this mechanism to satisfy four criteria:
(a) . . . promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable 
development; (b) . . . incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;
(c) . . . contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will 
benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be
used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and (d) . . . 
deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.141 
This option is an expansion of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism, which allows emission reduction projects in developing countries
to generate credits that developed countries could apply towards their 
emission reduction targets.142 Parties to the Paris Agreement must continue
to develop details regarding the mechanism, including what actions qualify 
for credit, how parties may transfer and account for the credits, and the 
relationship between the Paris Agreement’s two market-based mitigation 
options.143 The emission reduction and sustainable development mechanism 
has the potential to complicate the international transfer of credits, and
and ex post review strategies to monitor countries’ progress toward meeting their respective 
NDCs).
139. Paris Agreement, supra note 135, at art. 6.2.
 140. A Vision for the Market Provisions of the Paris Agreement, INT’L EMISSIONS 
TRADING ASS’N 7–8 (May 2016), http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Position_Papers/ 
2016/IETA_Article_6_Implementation_Paper_May2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/28RL-Q7SQ]. 
141. Paris Agreement, supra note 135, at art. 6.4. 
142. Andrei Marcu, Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement (Article 6), 
CTR.EUR.POL’Y STUD. 13 (Jan. 2006), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR%20No%20128%20 
ACM%20Post%20COP21%20Analysis%20of%20Article%206.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX4S-
RPSC]; INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, supra note 140, at 8.
143. Thomas L. Brewer et al., Carbon Market Clubs and the New Paris Regime:
Paper for the World Bank Group’s Networked Carbon Markets Initiative, WORLD BANK
25-26 (2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/323531476453676433/1700505-Carbon­
Market-Clubs-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HAM-9W7B]; Marcu, supra note 142, at 13. 
For information regarding the Clean Development Mechanism, see Clean Development 
Mechanism, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION CLIMATE CHANGE https://cdm.unfccc.int/ 
[https://perma.cc/G3GQ-94UM] (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). 
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new accounting measures will be necessary to determine how the credits
generated, pursuant to this mechanism, relate to the countries’ NDCs. 




The bottom-up emission reduction approaches described in Part IV
represent incremental progress toward the goal of reducing global GHG
emissions. The Clean Power Plan and the UNFCCC’s focus on NDCs are
modest in terms of their scope and emission reduction goals. The Clean
Power Plan focuses on a single sector of the U.S. economy, seeking to
achieve a 32% reduction in electric power sector emissions by 2030.144 
Many states are already on track to meet their emission targets with little 
or no additional action.145 Analysis of the INDC submissions demonstrate
that the cumulative emission reductions fall well short of the Copenhagen 
COP goal of a stabilized 2° Celsius increase, with some countries committing 
to emission reductions and others pledging to reduce carbon intensity
rather than overall emissions.146 California’s approach is more ambitious
in terms of emission reduction mandates, but the state may not regulate
activities beyond its borders.147 
Despite their limitations, each of these steps has resulted in important
policy experimentation and provided a foundation upon which more
comprehensive emission reduction efforts may emerge. The long-term
success of these efforts, therefore, depends less on near-term emission
reductions and more on how the initial design choices affect future emission
reduction options. 
144. By The Numbers: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/
20140602fs-important-numbers-clean-power-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D8K-Z6UL] (last
visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
145. Jeremy Richardson et al., States of Progress: Existing Commitments to Clean 
Energy Put Most States in Strong Position to Meet the EPA’s Final Clean Power Plan, 
Union Concerned Scientists (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/ 
reduce-emissions/clean-power-plan-states-of-progress#.Vi11NKLnciE [https://perma.cc/
Q8KL-BZ9T]; see also Clean Power Plan Final Rule – Regulatory Impact Analysis, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-final-
rule-regulatory-impact-analysis [https://perma.cc/Z5RT-S3YF] (last updated Oct. 22, 2015).
146. INDCs as Communicated by Parties, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.
aspx [https://perma.cc/U4RD-947E] (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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The next Part outlines three approaches to move from unilateral market-
based climate policy at the subnational or national levels to a broader,
multilateral approach: market linkage, club architecture, and networked 
heterogeneous markets. 
A. Bilateral or Multilateral Market Linkage 
Numerous commentators point to market linkage as a strategy to move
from individual commitments to a multilateral approach without formal 
international treaties.148 Linkage can take different forms. Two-way linkage 
involves two or more jurisdictions accepting emission allowances from 
one another.149 One-way linkage involves one jurisdiction accepting allowances
from another, but not vice versa.150 One-way linkage can occur when a
jurisdiction makes a unilateral decision to accept allowances from another
jurisdiction or a unilateral decision to allow allowances to be sold in another
jurisdiction.151 Indirect linkage involves systems that link with one system
that then links with another.152 If State A links with State B, and State B 
148. Rob Dellink et al., Towards Global Carbon Pricing: Direct and Indirect 
Linking of Carbon Markets, OECD J.: ECON. STUD. 209 (2014); Jane Ellis & Dennis 
Tirpak, Linking GHG Emission Trading Schemes and Markets, ORG. FOR ECON. CO­
OPERATION & DEV. (Oct. 2006), https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/37672298.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/DA9Z-88Y8]; Jessica F. Green et al., A Balance of Bottom-Up and Top-Down in
Linking Climate Policies, 4 NAT’L CLIMATE CHANGE 1064-656 (2014); Sonja Hawkins &
Ingrid Jegou, Linking Emissions Trading Schemes: Considerations and Recommendations 
for a Joint EU-Korean Carbon Market, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar.
2014), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2014/03/linking-emissions-trading-schemes-considerations-
and-recommendations-for-a-joint-eu-korean-carbon-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8HX­
EE3U]; Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging 
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 789 (2009); Andrew J. O’Connell, 
A Critical Analysis of Allowance Allocation in Cap-and-Trade and Its Effect on Linked
Carbon Markets, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L. J. 339, 366–72 (2014); Matthew Ranson & Robert N.
Stavins, Linkage of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems: Learning from
Experience (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 13-046, 
2013); Matthew Ranson & Robert N. Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture 
Based On Linkage Of Cap-And-Trade Systems, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 403 (2013); Peter 
Zaman & Adam Hedley, The Regulatory Framework to Support Carbon Market Linkage 
— A Concept Paper, REEDSMITH (Apr. 26, 2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/ 
680061461687518813/The-Regulatory-Framework-to-support-the-NCM-Linking-Model.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88MC-3Z9R]; see, e.g., The Paris Agreement and Beyond, supra note
138, at 53–68. 
149.  Green et al., supra note 148, at 1064–66. 
150. Id. 
151.  Newell et al., supra note 40, at 139–40. 
152.  Green et al., supra note 148, at 1064–65. 
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links with State C, then State A and State C are indirectly linked.153 The
allowance prices will equalize across all three jurisdictions.154 
Expanding an existing market through linkage may not be a seamless 
process, as it may require policy adjustments on the part of the linking 
jurisdictions. These adjustments, in turn, may create barriers that slow or 
stall the linking process. A growing body of scholarship points to a club
approach to foster multilateral cooperation on climate change mitigation
and adaptation, including the development of carbon markets. A club
framework may create an effective platform for market development, but 
still may face path dependency barriers if club members enter with established
emissions trading markets. Existing linked carbon markets avoided these 
challenges by coordinating with prospective partners during the initial 
market design phase. Jurisdictions developing unilateral markets may also 
streamline future linkage by aligning policy choices with those of dominant
existing carbon markets, such as the EU, ETS, or California Cap-and-
Trade Program. They may alternatively follow the Clean Power Plan’s
trading-ready model by identifying the minimal set of criteria necessary
to facilitate future linkage. 
Under a bottom-up linkage approach, choices by a diffuse collection of 
national and subnational actors affect whether and how markets evolve.
Differences may emerge regarding the stringency of the emissions limit, 
which entities may trade, what instruments may satisfy compliance obligations 
(e.g., whether carbon offsets are allowed and, if so, whether there are 
differences in protocols or liability), how allowances make their way into 
the market (e.g., auction, free allocation, or a combination), and the incorporation
of cost containment provisions. 
The two subnational carbon markets currently operating in the U.S. 
differ in some key aspects, making them incompatible without alterations.
The RGGI market applies to the electricity sector only, emissions are measured 
in short tons, and carbon offsets are limited by geography and the role 
they play in the market.155 In contrast, California’s market covers multiple
sectors, emissions are measured in metric tons, and the state establishes
specific criteria for domestic and international carbon offset credits that 
may count as compliance.156
 153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Welcome, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org [https://perma.
cc/Z8NE-B3TM] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
156. See supra notes 50–88. 
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Policy instability introduces a degree of market uncertainty for emission 
markets created by bottom-up linkage. Compliance-based emissions
markets exist due to policy choices, and those choices may be vulnerable
to shifts in political leadership. Officials in states participating in RGGI 
grappled with this issue in 2012 when New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
announced that his state would no longer participate in the RGGI market.157 
The governor pursued the market exit despite the fact that the RGGI auction 
had generated $188 million for the state and the move faced opposition in
the state’s legislature.158 The unilateral move required the remaining state 
participants to adjust the regional emissions cap and retire the 21 million
allowances associated with New Jersey’s share of the program.159 
Australia offers another cautionary tale for linked markets. Australia’s 
government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 and subsequently committed 
to reduce its emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020 under the 
Copenhagen Accord.160 The country also agreed to “reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions by 25% on 2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an
ambitious global deal capable of stabilizing levels of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq or lower,” and “by up to 15% by 2020
if there is a global agreement which falls short of securing atmospheric 
stabilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq and under which major developing economies 
commit to substantially restrain emissions and advanced economies take
on commitments comparable to Australia’s.”161 
The Australian Parliament implemented a suite of laws to meet its
Copenhagen commitments, including the Carbon Pricing Mechanism that 
started as a carbon tax and was to transition to an emissions trading system 
that linked with the EU ETS by 2015.162 After the 2013 Parliamentary 
elections resulted in a change in government, Prime Minister Abbott announced
that Australia would shift its climate policy approach and abandon the
157. Governor Christie claimed that the market was a failure due to consistently low 
allowance prices.  Justin Doom before New Jersey Exits RGGI, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 9,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-09/carbon-permits-sell-for-minimum­
before-new-jersey-exits-rggi [https://perma.cc/HD7  W- SRM4].
158. Id.; Maria Gallucci, NJ Legislators Working to Block Christie’s Carbon Market 
Exit, REUTERS (June 24, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/24/idUS720020
50520110624 [https://perma.cc/26PJ-B2LN]. 
159. Doom, supra note 157. 
160. Appendix I - Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, U.N.FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5264. 
php [https://perma.cc/GM6W-N79S] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
161. Id. 
162. Clean Energy Act, 2011, No. 131 (Austl.).  For a summary of Australia’s actions 
to address greenhouse gas emissions, see Marion Afriat et al., Australia: An Emissions Trading 
Case Study, INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, https://ieta.wildapricot.org/resources/Resources/
Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/australia_case_study_may2015.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5REG-AAHL] (last updated May 2015). 
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ETS.163 The transition occurred before the linkage with the EU ETS could 
take place, but emphasizes the uncertainties inherent in a decentralized,
linked market system.
Jurisdictions implementing their own GHG emission reduction strategies 
may be vulnerable to forum shopping, as market actors with geographic 
flexibility may locate in jurisdictions with less stringent policies.164 
Furthermore, a linked market approach may create an incentive for some
jurisdictions to implement a less stringent emissions cap to reduce domestic
allowance prices, or to bolster the domestic economy by attracting investment
in the lower cost allowances.165 
Beyond these overarching concerns that could fundamentally affect
market function, the policy design process inherent in carbon market
implementation may foster political and financial path dependency. To
the extent a jurisdiction’s initial market design choices reflect political 
compromises with key constituencies, there may be little flexibility to adjust 
those choices to facilitate market linkage. Similarly, initial decisions regarding 
emissions stringency and which instruments may trade in the market impact 
investments. Future alterations to these market elements may undermine 
the value of allowances purchased early for use at a later date. Moreover, 
investments made based on a less stringent emissions limit may result in 
stranded assets if a subsequently tighter cap makes the asset uneconomic
to operate.166 
Investments in offset projects may prove particularly vulnerable to path
dependency concerns. These projects may require a multiple year lead-
time before offset credits are available. A change in offset protocols before
project maturity may undermine the project. As offset projects may represent
both the potential to lower market costs by increasing the supply of compliance 
instruments as well as a political compromise to provide revenue opportunities 
for sectors such as forestry and agriculture, entrenched interests may quickly
develop that would oppose linkage with other jurisdictions if that linkage 
affected offset supply in the market or individual offset projects. 
163.  Afriat et al., supra note 162, at 3.
164. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change: 
Discussion Paper 2010-33, HARV.KENNEDY SCH. 17 (Jan. 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/Keohane_Victor_Final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YDY-XKK2].
165.  Green et al., supra note 148, at 1066. 
166. Barnett et al., Stranded Clean Air Costs: How Big?, 15 ELECTRICITY J., 64, 64– 
68 (July 2002), http://www.auburn.edu/~thomph1/cleanair.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K5R­
FRA3].
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California’s experience with offsets liability offers a current example of 
a policy design choice that may affect future linkage options.167 The state’s
market regulations place liability for the offset credit on the purchaser of
the offset. If the Air Resources Board determines that the credit is not 
valid due to a failure to meet all of the state’s criteria, the purchaser may
lose all value and have to look for additional compliance credits.168 
California officials determined that perfect alignment with its offset
liability requirements was not necessary for market linkage. Quebec created 
a buffer pool to serve as a backstop in the event an offsets project does not
perform as projected rather than imposing liability on the holder of the 
offset credit.169 In the end, these strategies were compatible. Each prevented 
underperforming offset projects from undermining the emissions cap. In
contrast, jurisdictions without an effective mechanism to protect against
problems with offsets credits would likely fail California’s requirement
that linked jurisdictions include requirements for offsets that are at least
as stringent as the state’s own provisions.170 
167. For example, if a forest offsets project sells credits into a market but later burns, 
the project may fail to sequester carbon.  Charles Schmidt, Carbon Offsets: Growing Pains 
in a Growing Market, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 62, 62 (Feb. 2009), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/117/2/ehp.117-a62.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC7U-DBE3].
168. A recent example highlights the liability process.  In September 2015, the Air 
Resources Board launched an investigation to determine whether a dairy farm selling
offset credits for livestock methane destruction was in compliance with the permitting 
rules of Indiana the state where it is based, as required by the California’s Cap-and-Trade
Regulation. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95985(c)(2) (WestlawNext through 3/10/17
Register 2017, No. 10); Amendments to California’s Cap-and-Trade Program: Final 
Statement of Reasons, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (May 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
regact/2012/capandtrade12/linkfsor.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT7Y-3DLB] (discussing rationale
for linking with Quebec and amendments to the state’s regulations to facilitate the linkage); 
Facts about Livestock Methane Compliance Offset Credits under Investigation, CAL. AIR 
RESOURCES BOARD (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/bos_dairy_
offset_investigation_faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ3H-5Z29]. In February 2016, the agency
issued its final determination, finding that the project was in compliance with Indiana law.
Final Determination: Air Resources Board Compliance Offset Investigation Compliance 
Offset Protocol for Livestock Projects, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/bos_determination.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
LY7W-FFQ7].  Holders of offset credits generated by the facility were unable to use the
credits during the five-month investigation.  Project Information: CAR1055, CLIMATE ACTION
RES., https://thereserve2.apx.com/mymodule/reg/prjView.asp?id1=1055 [https://perma.cc/3BMC­
2HG2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
169. The Quebec market requires offset projects to place 3% of the credits generated 
by the project into the buffer pool.  See Kamala Harris, Memo to Cliff Rechtschaffen re
Attorney General’s Advice to the Governor Concerning Linkage of California and Quebec
Cap-and-Trade Programs, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST.  3 (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/ 
AG_Letter_SB_1018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVE8-59J5].
170. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West, WestlawNext through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
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Similarly, the Clean Power Plan raised a host of policy considerations
as California evaluated whether or not to participate in a trading-ready
market system, highlighting the linkage policy questions that may arise 
when jurisdictions approach the prospect of market linkage with fundamentally
different starting points.171 California does not need to pursue the trading-
ready approach in order to comply with the rule. The state measures approach
outlined in the Clean Power Plan would allow the state to submit a plan 
that demonstrates a combination of state policies, including the Cap-and-
Trade Program, will result in the state’s existing power plants meeting or 
exceeding their Clean Power Plan obligations.172 
California’s carbon market is more extensive than the Clean Power 
Plan. Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act applies to existing sources stationary
combustion turbines and electric generating steam units. This approach
contrasts with California’s multi-sectorial approach. Furthermore, the
EPA interprets Section 111(d) to prohibit carbon offset credits, explicitly
precludes offsets from state plans, and does not include a floor price or 
cost containment reserve.173 
In August 2016, the California Air Resources Board submitted its proposed 
Clean Power Plan compliance plan, indicating that it would rely on in­
state policies for compliance and would not engage in any multi-state 
markets that may emerge under the rule.174 If California were to eventually
pursue linkage with a Clean Power Plan market, it would presumably have 
to create a mechanism for excluding interaction between offset credits and 
the Clean Power Plan market. Otherwise, the offsets aspects of the California 
171. Clean Power Plan Compliance Discussion Paper, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD
(Sept. 2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/powerplants/meetings/2015whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YGH9-J759].
172. Tarr, supra note 103. 
173. The Clean Power Plan does not restrict states from implementing cost containment
mechanisms. 
See Allison Donnelly et al., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under Section 
111(D) of the Clean Air Act: Implications for Petroleum Refineries, DUKE NICHOLAS INST.
FOR ENVTL. POL’Y SOLUTIONS (June 2014), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/
files/publications/ni_wp_14-05_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFX5-PXJH]).  Without a coordinated
approach, however, a cost containment mechanism in one state would be ineffective if
other states did not include similar provisions; the covered entities could purchase fungible 
allowances in the other states.  See id.  California may face a similar issue if Clean Power 
Plan allowances were fungible in the California system.  See generally id. 
174. California’s Proposed Compliance Plan for the Federal Clean Power Plan, 
CAL.AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/powerplants/meetings/ 
09222016/proposedplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/33QH-5K4X].
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market would propagate into the Clean Power Plan market. California may
also need to separate the electricity sector use of Clean Power Plan credits
with the other sectors covered by the California market.175 
Before deciding whether to alter the state market to allow existing 
power plants within the state to participate in a Clean Power Plan market, 
officials will need to weigh whether to scale back some of the state’s policy
goals in order to expand the scope of the market. For example, allowing 
power plants located within California to participate in a multi-state Clean
Power Plan market could have a direct impact on the supply of allowances 
and the price of those allowances in the state’s market.176 It may also mean
ceding California’s control over market design, as the Clean Power Plan
establishes the rules for trading and California has little or no flexibility
to alter those rules. By linking with the Clean Power Plan market, therefore,
California may diminish its influence over future carbon market design.
Each of these points may complicate the ability to alter a jurisdiction’s
initial choices to foster linkage with other markets.
B. Club Architecture
A number of scholars and practitioners point to the concept of international 
clubs as a model for a bottom-up approach to reaching multilateral approaches 
to climate change mitigation.177 Clubs theory focuses on “goods that are
175. The EPA may develop existing source performance standards for other
categories of sources.  For example, in December 2010, the EPA entered into a settlement 
agreement requiring it to develop existing source performance standards for refineries and 
fossil fuel-fired power plants. See Refinery GHG Settlement Agreement, American
Petroleum Institute v. E.P.A., No. 08-1277 (D.C. Cir. 2010), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2013-09/documents/refineryghgsettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VHX­
52PY]; Boiler GHG Settlement Agreement, New York v. E.P.A., No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/boilerghgsettlement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VHX-52PY].  The EPA missed the court-approved deadlines included 
in both agreements, and has not announced any official steps to develop CO2 performance 
standards for the refinery sector.  For a discussion of potential regulatory approaches to the 
refining sector, see Donnelly et al., supra note 173. 
176. If given the choice to sell allowances in either market, the profit maximizing
business would be expected to choose the market offering the highest prices. 
177. See, e.g., David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations, 
in  ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN A POST­
KYOTO WORLD 144 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, eds., 2007) (predicting that 
“what is likely to occur is not an integrated international emission trading system but, rather, a
series of fragmented markets.”  For example, Victor describes a “zone” of countries that, “have
the will and capability to create meaningful emission markets.  These countries all have intense 
trading and investment relationships with each other.  Their institutions tend to recognize 
each other – even to the point of allowing extraterritorial application of law.  For these 
countries it is a relatively small step to imagine that they would extend their trading
relationships to include a nascent currency of tradable emission credits.  What defines the
zone, however, is not their common interest in controlling emissions – indeed, their
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at least partially excludable (it is possible to exclude nonmembers from 
accessing them) and at least partially nonrivalrous (one individual’s use 
of the good does not subtract from another individual’s simultaneous use 
of that good)—[U]tility-maximizing actors have an incentive to share
club goods with other actors and charge membership fees or tolls.”178 
Examples of climate mitigation activity through a club framework include: 
the Asia Pacific Partnership, an agreement of Pacific Rim countries to
partner on clean energy research and development; the 17-member Major
Emitters Forum on Energy and Climate Change, a club of 17 nations seeking 
to “help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful
outcome at the annual UN climate negotiations and advance the exploration 
of concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply of clean 
energy while cutting greenhouse gas emissions;” and the G8, which regularly
focuses on climate change during its annual meetings.179 Carbon market
participation may also be a price of entry for larger clubs. Eastern European
states were required to participate in the EU ETS as a condition of European
Union membership.180 
The focus on clubs takes as a starting point the self-interested stance of 
governments and private firms and seeks to build upon those interests to
develop an effective climate regime. As Keohane and Victor note, the 
UNFCCC process is a departure from the typical process for developing 
international regimes, as those regimes “often come about not through
deliberate decision-making at one international conference, but rather
emerge as a result of ‘codifying informal rights and rules that have evolved 
interests vary considerably as is evident when comparing the domestic policies in the EU,
United States and Australia – but rather their institutional capabilities and the extent to
which other members in the zone are confident in those capabilities.”).
178. Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection, 32
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341, 364 (June 2013). 
179. Major Economies Held Dialogue for Paris Success, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lima/major-economies­
held-dialogue-for-paris-success/ [https://perma.cc/EF5Z-MZ2H] (last visited Mar. 27,
2017); see also Keohane & Victor, supra note 164, at 12; Major Economies Forum 
on Energy and Climate, MAJOR ECONOMIES F., http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org 
[https://perma.cc/V56U-Z364] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (“The 17 major economies
participating in the MEF are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.”). 
180.  Ranson & Stavins, supra note 173, at 1, 7.
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over time through a process of converging expectations or tacit bargaining.’
That is, they emerge in path-dependent, historically-shaped ways.”181 
Self-interest may take many forms. Countries may already work together
on multilateral goals, such as trade liberalization or monetary policy. The 
existing institutions and familiarity may lend themselves to incorporating 
climate mitigation into the relationship. A desire for legitimacy may also 
spur interest in club membership. Recent economic powerhouses such as 
China, or emerging economies such as India or Brazil, may see benefits 
to participation in multilateral climate mitigation efforts. 
Self-interest may also arise from a desire to address public health impacts
of other air pollutants, with climate mitigation as a byproduct. Alternatively, 
the self-interest may explicitly include addressing climate change. Once a 
jurisdiction makes the unilateral decision to implement GHG reduction
measures, government officials may seek to lower compliance costs for 
their covered sectors by allowing access to emission reduction options available
in a larger market system. Nations seeking to address climate change may 
also recognize that multilateral action is necessary to lower global emissions, 
thus leading that nation to participate in an international market even if doing 
so requires compromise on policy objectives. 
Club approaches to multilateral market-based climate policy may evolve 
via different pathways. A clubs approach to climate mitigation could emerge 
under existing international frameworks, such as regional trade agreements 
or other existing international frameworks.182 A clubs approach could also
include firm-based cooperation in addition to, or in lieu of, governmental
cooperation.183 For example, Stewart, et al. propose three “building blocks”
to achieve multilateral action on climate change: a club strategy, a linkage 
strategy, and a dominant market participant strategy.184 The authors note
that meaningful climate mitigation may occur through cooperation at the 
governmental level or through firms with a dominant market position and 
focus on the many forms of cooperation and linkage possible through existing
institutions.185 Market-based approaches are not central to Stewart, et al.’s
building blocks approach, but the authors do cite linking markets through 
181. Keohane & Victor, supra note 164, at 3 (quoting ORAN R. YOUNG, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 10 (1997)). 
182. See, e.g., Zaman & Hedley, supra note 173, at 16–18 (noting the potential for,
and barriers to, carbon market development pursuant to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or 
World Trade Organization). 
183. Stewart et al., supra note 32, at 3–4. 
184. Id. Other scholars have proposed a “building blocks” framework for global 
climate mitigation measures.  See e.g., Robert Falkner et al., International Climate Policy 
After Copenhagen: Towards a “Building Blocks” Approach, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 252, 253– 
258 (Oct. 2010). 
185. Stewart et al., 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
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a club framework among the options to implement the building blocks
approach.186 Furthermore, the building block strategy includes bilateral
and regional air quality programs among the options for leveraging existing
institutions “to provide the basis and create support for future regulatory
recognition, offset trading, and, eventually, full greenhouse gas emission
trading programs.”187 
A third approach to club-based GHG mitigation measures could focus 
specifically on the development of carbon markets. For example, Green, 
et al. focus directly on an incremental approach to market linkage,
concentrating first on developed countries due to the higher likelihood that
they will have “robust regulatory systems to support successful implementation,
monitoring and compliance mechanisms required for a functional system” 
and “the differences in marginal costs of abatement are likely to be relatively
small, wealth transfers will be correspondingly low, relative to total allowance 
value.”188 The authors suggest minimizing indirect linkages due to the
political uncertainty associated with the absence of explicit agreement, and 
ensuring direct coordination among linking jurisdictions to ensure consistency
in market design.189 
V. OPTIONS FOR STREAMLINING MARKET LINKAGE
Club architecture offers the potential to streamline policy choices
and may lead to long-term stability if the club partners have an interest in
maintaining positive relations or seek to achieve multiple policy objects 
through the club. Club participants may also proactively address market
design concerns presented by bottom-up strategies, such as protecting against 
forum shopping and leakage, and bolstering market stability by anticipating
the prospect that one or more club members may withdraw.190 
Path dependency barriers to market linkage may persist, however, as market 
implementation may realign political constituencies. These concerns are 
186.  Stewart et al., supra note 178, at 374; id. at 344 (noting that the linkage element in
Stewart’s proposed building blocks refers to “leverage[ing] existing transnational organizations 
with missions other than climate protection,” rather than linked carbon markets.).
Programs, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 2–3 (Aug. 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/
 187. Id. at 375–76. 
188. 
3. 
 Green et al., supra note 148, at 1066; see also Keohane et al., supra note 12, at 
189. 
190. 
 Green et al., supra note 148, at 1066–67. 
William A. Pizer & Andrew J. Yates, Terminating Links between Emission Trading
WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU4G-3MF8].
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not insurmountable. Emissions markets have undergone adjustments in
the past, and future adjustments are likely.191 Yet, the need to make significant 
changes to facilitate market linkage may disincentivize linkage with certain
partners, fostering a more balkanized, less efficient approach to emissions 
reductions than would otherwise occur if market participants were subject
to the same set of rules or engaged in market design at the same time.
The following subparts discuss three strategies to standardize design
choices, thereby reducing path dependency barriers to market linkage. First, 
linkage may occur through a coordinated approach involving simultaneous 
development of carbon markets. Second, a jurisdiction may unilaterally
design its market approach to accommodate future linkage, providing a 
clear set of market characteristics that future linking partners must include
in order to facilitate linkage. Under this strategy, a dominant jurisdiction 
sets the terms for future market linkage. Third, jurisdictions may identify 
a standardized approach to key market design choices through a common
elements framework such as the “trading-ready” approaches embedded in
the U.S. EPA’s Clean Power Plan rule. Each approach would facilitate
full fungibility of emission allowances or offset credits.192 
A. Coordinated Design Strategy 
The California and Quebec experience is an example of the benefits of 
a coordinated design strategy. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) process
allowed both jurisdictions to jointly contemplate market linkage while 
developing initial regulations establishing their respective markets.193 As
a result, each jurisdiction included similar provisions that streamlined the
linkage process.194 
In addition to ex ante incorporation of linkage procedures, the coordinated 
market design approach minimizes path dependency obstacles for initial 
linkage. Although officials in California and Quebec did not make identical
191.  Newell et al., supra note 40. 
192. This paper does not discuss other alternatives for market interaction, such as
implementing emission allowance exchange rates.  For a discussion of emission allowance 
exchange rates, see O’Connell, supra note 173, at 371–72. 
193. WCI Design Recommendations, supra note 99, at 1, 13, 15–17; see, e.g., CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95941 (WestlawNext through 3/10/17 Register 2017, No. 10) 
(establishing procedures for market linkage); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West, 
WestlawNext through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, supra note 
174. 
194. For example, the two market systems included identical restrictions on the 
percentage of offsets that a covered entity may submit in a compliance period, see Katherine 
Hsia-Kiung et al., Carbon Market California: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Golden State’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program, ENVTL.DEF.FUND 18 (2014), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/
content/carbon-market-california-year_two.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW6W-LC9T]. 
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market design choices, the ongoing WCI partnership allowed them to
coordinate many of the provisions and understand the key differences that
would need to be addressed to facilitate linkage. For example, the different
approaches to offsets liability did not prohibit linkage because each approach 
addresses concerns about the environmental integrity of the compliance 
instruments. Officials determined that the two approaches—the offsets
reserve pool in Quebec and buyer liability in California—were able to operate 
in parallel. Similarly, Ontario’s participation in the WCI should similarly
streamline the expansion of the carbon market. 
The coordinated approach allows prospective market partners to identify 
the key market design decision-points at the outset, work together to evaluate
market design options, and make regulatory decisions in their respective 
jurisdictions with an understanding of how those actions relate to actions
taken by their prospective linking partners. This approach allows the common
design choices to emerge among the partners, minimizing future hurdles with 
the linking process.
B. Dominant Actor Strategy 
The EU ETS and the California Cap-and-Trade Program have emerged 
as desirable linking partners, situating the two programs as dominant actors
in the arena of market linkage.195 Both already operate as linked systems,
and both have expressed the desire to link with additional jurisdictions. 
The EU market is by far the world’s largest carbon market.196 Also, as the
first multinational carbon market, the EU system has identified and addressed 
market design issues, such as allowance allocation, verifiable emissions
data, and continuity between design periods.197 The California and Quebec 
market is the only international carbon market consisting of subnational 
entities, and California actively seeks relationships with other subnational
195. This subsection borrows from Stewart et al.’s discussion of dominant firms. 
Stewart et al., supra note 178, at 345 (“Where dominant public or private actors enjoy
sufficient economic, strategic, or reputational gain from being a first mover in adopting 
regulatory or market standards, they may act unilaterally to induce others in the sector to
follow suit (for example, the expansion of the European Union Aviation directive to foreign
airlines).  In appropriate contexts, dominant actors may have incentives to adopt measures 
that have the purpose or effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
196. Newell et al., supra note 40, at 126–27. 
197. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66, 66, 70 
(2007).
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actors with which it may link markets or from which it may accept offset
credits in the future.198 Furthermore, both the EU and California are
important economic actors and jurisdictions considering carbon market 
linkage may hope to realize benefits beyond those associated directly with 
market-based climate change mitigation.199 
The influence of the EU ETS and the California market is important for 
three reasons. First, unlike the period when the two markets were under
development, models for carbon market design now exist. Jurisdictions
considering market-based climate policy are not starting from scratch.
Second, government officials undertaking efforts to design new carbon
markets may do so with an eye toward linkage and identify prospective
linking partners early in the design process. The design features necessary
to facilitate market linkage are evident in the existing market format.
The announced intentions by New Zealand, South Korea, and Australia to 
link with the EU ETS all provide examples of this approach. Third, the 
jurisdictions with established markets attracting attention among potential 
partner jurisdictions may set the terms for market design. 
The 2015 announcement by New York Governor Andrew Cuomo that
his administration intends to “work with California and other jurisdictions 
to develop a broad North American carbon market” may prove more 
challenging.200 Both RGGI, of which New York is a participant, and California
have successful track records. Yet, the markets differ from one another in 
important ways. First, California’s market covers multiple sectors of the
economy while RGGI only covers the electricity sector. Second, the California 
regulations include market oversight provisions, including tracking ownership
of allowances and imposing holding limits that restrict the number of 
allowances a market participant may hold at any given time, requirements
that do not apply to RGGI market participants.201 Third, the emissions cap 
and the treatment of offsets also differ between the two markets. The
different sectoral coverage would not prevent linkage, as regulators could 
adjust the overall emissions cap for the linked market based on the scope
198. For a summary of current national and subnational carbon markets in place across 
the globe, see Brewer et al., supra note 143. 
199. Stewart et al., supra note 178, at 374. 
200. Press Release, State of N.Y., Governor Cuomo, Joined by Vice President Gore, 
Announces New Actions to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Lead Nation on Climate 
Change (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/1BC8381FF19B
584485257ED80070792B/$File/gov%2010.8.15.pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/ULA9­
WLLZ]. 
201. See, e.g., Market Program Monitoring, CAL. AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/marketmonitoring/marketmonitoring.htm [https://perma.cc/
PV6U-8AW5] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
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of coverage. The other differences, however, may undermine design choices 
in one market or the other. 
The distinctions between the California and RGGI markets highlight the
potential difficulty with established markets that develop independently then
seek to link at a later date. It is not clear whether either state would cede 
the role of dominant market actor to the other. Market changes by either
or both jurisdictions would affect the market participants within their
borders, as well as their existing linking partners. Officials representing
New York and California may determine that the dominant actor model
offers the least disruptive approach for the majority of market participants.
Alternatively, the two states may forgo attempts to streamline the linkage 
process in favor of a more robust reorganization of market design choices 
through a coordinated approach.202 
C. Common Elements Strategy 
The previous two strategies provide linkage options when jurisdictions
have identified prospective partners. In instances where a jurisdiction is 
establishing a market and anticipates future linkage with unidentified partners,
a “common elements” strategy similar to the Clean Power Plan trading-
ready concept may provide a useful model.203 States adopting the trading-
ready approach would allow diffuse markets to emerge if power plant 
operators determined it was in their interest to participate in such a market.
The approach would not require state regulators to design the markets or
endorse participation in the markets. 
Two existing models provided support for the Clean Power Plan trading-
ready option. First, many state-level renewable portfolio standards (RPSs)
operate under a similar “common elements” framework. These programs
identify a percentage of renewable energy that retail electricity providers 
must include in their respective generation mix. Compliance entities may 
satisfy their obligations by either investing directly in qualifying renewable 
202. This article does not provide an exhaustive description of linkage options. For 
example, New York and California could consider a less centralized approach to market 
linkage through an exchange rate model.  See Bodansky, supra note 88, at 3.
203. This article opts for the common elements terminology rather than trading-
ready because additional steps beyond simply incorporating common market provisions 
may be necessary to facilitate trading. See Monast et al., supra note 114. 
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facilities or submit renewable energy credits (RECs) that represent one-
megawatt hour of qualifying renewable energy generation.204 
Multistate REC markets have emerged when states incorporate similar 
definitions for tradable compliance instruments and allow entities to generate
those compliance instruments beyond the state’s borders.205 These jurisdictions
often allow covered entities to utilize credits that originate either inside or 
outside the state, so long as they meet criteria specified by the state of
compliance.206 In addition to defining the RECs and what constitutes a
renewable energy facility, state RPSs designate approved tracking systems
to protect against double counting. This model allows interstate REC 
trading without requiring perfect alignment of state RPS policies. For example,
some include a broad suite of generation options under the definition of
“renewable,” while others are more restrictive.207 Similarly, some states include
specific requirements for certain generation options, such as minimum 
percentages of solar generation or, in the case of North Carolina, requirements
to purchase electricity generated by swine and poultry waste.208 As long 
as a renewable energy facility satisfies the criteria of qualifying generation
under multiple state RPS policies, the REC may trade among the states 
without requiring those states to enter into agreements with one another. 
The RGGI system offers another model that informs the trading-ready 
concept, as it operates as a linked market rather than a single, top-down 
system. In order to avoid potential Compact Clause challenges, the state
negotiators developed a model rule specifying the program’s components,
including emission caps, permits and allowance allocations, tracking 
system requirements, and rules governing trading.209 The states participating 
in RGGI each implemented their own legislation and regulations to implement
the model rule provisions, thereby creating a regional market based on a
204. In some states, energy efficiency credits can count toward RPS requirements. 
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)-(i) (LexisAdvance through session Laws 2016­
124 of the 2016 Third Extra Session, Session Laws 2016-126 of the 2016 Fourth Extra 
Session, and Session Laws 2017-2 of the 2017 Regular Session). 
205. Jan Hamrin, REC Definitions and Tracking Mechanisms Used by State RPS
Programs, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE (June 2014), http://www.cesa.org/assets/2014­
Files/RECs-Attribute-Definitions-Hamrin-June-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTM9-99K4].
206. See Monast et al., supra note 114. 
207. Warren Leon et al., Clean Energy Champions: The Importance of State Programs 
and Policies, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE (June 2015), http://www.cesa.org/assets/ 
2015-Files/Clean-Energy-Champions.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EST-Q2H2]. 
208. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://energy.gov/savings/renewable-energy-and-energy-efficiency-portfolio-standard
[https://perma.cc/95VF-MZAR] (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). 
209. Model Rule Part XX CO2 Budget Trading Program, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE 
GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 23, 2013), http://rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/_FinalProgramReview
Materials/Model_Rule_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/76FF-9EKW].
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common set of rules rather than a single unified program.210 The RGGI 
created its own nonprofit to facilitate allowance auctions and monitor 
compliance.211 However, at its core, RGGI is an example of a trading-
ready CO2 mitigation program that imposes emissions limits on a specified
group of sources, establishes emission allowances to comply with the
emission caps, and allows interstate trading of those allowances.212 
Policymakers seeking to standardize key market design choices through 
a common elements strategy may draw from three sources. First, jurisdictions 
anticipating future market linkage may identify the criteria necessary to 
facilitate market linkage by conducting a general survey of design approaches 
underlying existing carbon markets. The precedent for linking carbon markets, 
albeit still relatively limited, provides insights into the compatibility of
design elements and the options for aligning dissimilar market provisions. 
At minimum, the common aspects of existing carbon trading include a cap
on emissions, a legally-binding obligation for specific sources of GHGs
emissions, identification of the tradable compliance instruments, and measures 
to ensure that the tradable instruments meet the legal requirements and 
protect against double-counting.
Second, linkage criteria spelled out by California regulations or by European
Union Directives may provide additional guidance for jurisdictions seeking 
to align carbon market design choices through a common elements approach.213 
In addition to the minimal elements necessary for market linkage identified
above, additional alignment may include common protocols for offset
credits and similar emission stringency.214 
Third, government officials tasked with designing a market while
preserving the option for future linkage may focus particular attention on 
210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 22a-200c (West, WestlawNext through
General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958, Revised to January 1, 2017); CONN.
AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-174-31(3) (WestlawNext through Conn. L.J. through 3/21/2017); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6043 (LexisAdvance through 81 Del. Laws, ch. 2). 
211. Mission Statement, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/rggi
[https://perma.cc/BG5Y-M9LX] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
212. Susan F. Tierney et al., RGGI and CO2 Emissions Trading Under the Clean
Power Plan: Options for Trading Among Generating Units in RGGI and Other States, 
ANALYSIS GROUP, INC. (July 12, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/07/12/document
_cw_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULB4-5GC8]. 
213. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894 (West, WestlawNext through Ch. 3 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); 
Council Directive 2009/29/EC, 2009 O.J. (L. 140/63); Climate Action: International 
Carbon Market, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/markets_en [https:// 
perma.cc/4YVL-LJLK] (last updated July 1, 2016). 
214. EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 213.
 221























        
 
  
   
 
 




   
 
 
    
 
 
MONAST (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2017 10:15 AM 
the potential for market features to affect design choices in other markets.
Some market components may propagate into linked markets, while others 
may affect the function and impacts of the domestic market but not directly
affect other markets through linkage. For example, choices between allocating
allowances for free, auctioning allowances, or both, would have domestic
impacts.215 Furthermore, if jurisdictions choose to allocate allowances, they
have a choice regarding which entities receive the allowances and what
they may do with the proceeds.216 Examples include distribution based on 
historic electricity generation, generation based on electricity output, 
or allocation to distribution companies rather than electricity generators.217 
Similarly, jurisdictions that auction allowances may choose to use the
revenue to implement complementary policies such as energy efficiency
programs,218 refund the value back to consumers,219 or incorporate the
revenue into the government’s general operations funds.220 While these
choices affect the economic impacts of the program,221 different approaches
to entering allowances into the marketplace would not affect the function
of markets in other jurisdictions with which the jurisdiction may link. 
In contrast, other design elements such as the stringency of the emissions
cap, cost containment mechanisms, and acceptance of offsets would propagate 
into other markets. A stringent emissions cap in one jurisdiction and a less
stringent cap in another would cause overall prices to decrease as the lax 
cap would mean more allowances in the marketplace and thus affect the 
supply and demand ratio. 
Cost containment provisions come in many forms. Jurisdictions may
implement a price ceiling, a price floor, or an allowance reserve to make
 215. Participating in the EU ETS, U.K. DEPT. BUS. ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY
(Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/participating-in-the-eu-ets [https://perma.cc/ 
YN7J-UM6R].
216. James Nachbaur & Tiffany Roberts, Evaluating the Policy Trade-offs in ARB’s 
Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
reports/2012/rsrc/cap-and-trade/cap-and-trade-020912.aspx [https://perma.cc/SE5H-P6HX].
217. GHG Abate Measures, Envtl. Protection Agency on Allowance Allocation 
Proposed Rule Technical Support Document, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY OFF. AIR
& RADIATION (June 10, 2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/ 
20140602tsd-ghg-abatement-measures.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS4K-GG82]. 
218. Why Energy Efficiency?, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.
rggi.org/rggi_benefits/why_efficiency [https://perma.cc/BR5P-ZYQM] (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). 
219. Anne C. Mulkern, Gov. Brown Proposes to Borrow $500M from Cap-and-
Trade Revenue, E&E NEWS (May 15, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981189
[https://perma.cc/JV43-A9RZ].
220. Mulkern, supra note 219. 
221. Industry Windfall Profits from Europe’s Carbon Market, CARBON MKT. WATCH
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additional allowances available at a specific price. Market linkage between a
jurisdiction with cost containment provisions and one without the same 
provisions would affect prices in both markets. For example, if State A
has a price floor and State B does not, a market actor could potentially 
purchase cheaper allowances in State B and submit them for compliance 
in State A. The price floor would no longer prevent allowance prices from 
dropping beneath the floor.222 Market oversight, including approaches to
foster transparency regarding what is trading and where, access to market
information such as trading volume and prices, and control against financial 
market manipulation could also affect market operations in linked 
jurisdictions.223 
The focus on propagation may minimize the potential for investment-
based path dependency while also allowing government officials to make 
political compromises for the non-propagating market aspects. As a threshold 
matter, decisions regarding what instruments may trade and the mechanisms
for tracking the instruments to ensure their integrity and protect against
fraud are necessary elements to facilitate linkage with any existing carbon 
market system. Furthermore, accounting rules establishing the framework
for measuring emissions and evaluating the performance of the market are
key aspects of an effecting carbon market. The UNFCCC process has made 
progress on measurement, reporting, and verification provisions, but the
prospect of international monitoring remains controversial.224 Effective
enforcement is a further necessary component to ensure the integrity of
a market system. Without capable government oversight, the market may
not achieve the environmental goals for which it was created due to fraud
on the part of market participants. 
As the California and Quebec market linkage demonstrates, absolute 
alignment is not necessary to facilitate linkage. Addressing those aspects 
that may propagate, and thus affect the market value or political compromises 
in other jurisdictions, however, might be necessary before linkage may 
occur. 
222. Alan Durning & Yoram Bauman, 17 Things to Know About California’s Carbon
Cap: The Golden State Rules, SIGHTLINE INST. (May 22, 2014), http://www.sightline.org/
2014/05/22/17-things-to-know-about-californias-carbon-cap/ [https://perma.cc/R8ZQ-UYPV]. 
223. Ranson & Stavins, Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based On Linkage 
Of Cap-And-Trade Systems, supra note 148, at 410. 
224. David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate 
Governance, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 8 (2010). 
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VI. CONCLUSION
The shift from a centralized, top-down approach to a diffuse, bottom-
up approach to carbon market implementation has important implications 
for the effectiveness, cost, and complexity of mitigation efforts. The ultimate 
impact of these diffuse steps depends on whether or not they contribute to 
the long-term development of a broad, multilateral strategy capable of 
aggressively reducing global emissions. Market linkage and clubs architecture
offer promising pathways to move from incremental to comprehensive
measures, but the evolutionary process will depend upon careful initial 
policy design that streamlines multijurisdictional cooperation. Existing 
experiences with national and subnational carbon market linkage, and the 
common elements strategy embedded in the U.S. EPA’s Clean Power Plan, 
provide import lessons to help facilitate that movement toward a global
solution to a global commons problem.
224
